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World-wide Perspectives



KEY DATES

20-22 November - Conference on European Security sponsored by the Christian Peace Conference (Communist-controlled) at Eisenach, East Germany

20 December - Day of Solidarity with National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, observed by International Communist Fronts

4-11 January - Havana Cultural Congress (representatives from Asia, Africa and Latin America)

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SHORT SUBJECTS

ICFTU Denounces Shelepin Appointment. The appointment of Alexander N. Shelepin as President of the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions is the subject of a statement released by the ICFTU, copy attached. The statement points out that Shelepin's background is that of Komosmol (youth) leader and head of the Soviet secret police. His predecessors in the position also came from non-labor backgrounds (excepting only Mikhail Tomsky, president of the union council from 1921 to 1929). The ICFTU release notes that Shelepin was chosen to be vice-president of the communist controlled World Federation of Trade Unions on 5 September -- only eight weeks after his appointment to the Soviet trade Council.

"Jeune Afrique" Makes Damaging Admissions. The French-language magazine "Jeune Afrique," published by Africans in Paris, follows a strongly anti-American, anti-colonialist, pro-Third World line which usually results in strong support to the likes of Sekou Toure, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Boumedienne, and Nasser. In an article in the 20 August 1967 edition entitled "The Era of De-Nkrumahization," the magazine makes two rather damaging admissions: that under Nkrumah Chinese instructors trained guerrilla fighters from African countries whose governments did not accept the leadership of Nkrumah; and that during Nkrumah's reign inefficiency, incompetence and corruption were widespread among the leadership. These are remarkably strong words for that publication and should serve as useful quotations for assets dealing with African affairs. A copy of the pertinent extract is attached. (It should be noted that the remainder of the article consists largely of criticism of the present Ghanaian government and claims that the reason elections are not being held is that Nkrumah would be a shoo-in.)

Soviets Censor Tito Article. On 6 October Pravda published an abridged version of an article by Tito in praise of the October Revolution that had originally been published in the Yugoslav weekly Kommunist on 14 September and in the Yugoslav daily Borba on the same day. 50X1-HUM

[redacted]

Soviet Broadcasts to Communist China. The purportedly unofficial "Radio Peace and Progress," describing itself as sponsored by Soviet public organizations, on 17 October inaugurated two daily half-hour programs each in the Cantonese and Shanghai (Wu) languages. An announcement of

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the new services explains that they have been introduced in response to requests from listeners (sic) in China and Southeast Asia that broadcasts be carried in these languages in addition to Mandarin. As at the time of the inauguration of the Mandarin service of "Radio Peace and Progress" on 1 March this year, the announcement states that the new programs will cover life in the Soviet Union and important world news, as well as inform Chinese listeners of "the real situation" in the CPR and of the friendly feelings of the Soviet people toward the Chinese people. The inaugural programs of the new services offered greetings to listeners in "East and South China, which are rich in revolutionary tradition and where the plot of the Mao Tse-tung counterrevolutionary group is encountering firm opposition from the people."

Soviet KGB Defector Runge. The defection of a high-ranking KGB officer, Lt. Col. Yevgeniy Runge, was announced by the Department of State on 16 October 1967. Almost simultaneously the West German Government revealed the arrest of several members of a Soviet spy-ring in Bonn leading into the West German Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy, among other targets. It is expected that additional information garnered from the defector will be surfaced in the near future.

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The Che Guevara Affair. Che Guevara's death will continue to be in the news for some time; coverage will be prolonged by the trial of Regis Debray, who was a cohort of Che Guevara, and by Cuban attempts to elevate Guevara to martyrdom.

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(20 September to 18 October 1967)

1. New Setbacks -- on the world scene, within the Communist camp, and internally -- have further dampened Soviet efforts to trumpet the "triumph" theme of the 50th anniversary. Significant developments of the past month include:

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b. The Yugoslavs and Rumanians publicly reiterate their opposition to an early world Communist conference (the former strongly and repeatedly, the latter implicitly -- in an article written by Sec-Gen Ceausescu for Pravda as part of its series by world Communist leaders on the 50th anniversary). Continued Soviet pressure to convene such a conference was reflected in further endorsements by Czech and Hungarian bosses Novotny and Kadar in a joint communique resulting from a Kadar visit to Czechoslovakia ("must be convened"), by Bulgarian boss Zhivkov in an article for Pravda ("an urgent necessity"), by Polish Party Secretary Jarosinski in an article written for Izvestiya ("now possible to start preparations"), and by the Finnish and Spanish Communist Parties in joint communiques with the Bulgarian and Polish parties, respectively.

c. The Netherlands Communist Party announced its decision not to attend the Moscow celebrations, to the accompaniment of a blistering attack on the CPSU for having "left the road of the 1917 revolution" -- especially as demonstrated by Soviet policies in Indonesia and the Middle East.

d. The traditional Soviet holiday slogans -- markedly inner-directed, or even defensive, in contrast to those of recent years -- seem to reveal serious concern about internal unity and cooperation. Foreign-directed slogans, formerly at the head of the list, now are ranked as Nos. 41-53 in a total of 57; the only specific citations are the "courageous Vietnamese people who are waging an heroic struggle against the aggression of American imperialism" (#52) and "the peoples of the Arab countries" against "Israel aggression" (#53).

2. In Communist China, Peking's "new course" toward moderation and restoration of order, evident since late August and strongly emphasized during the 1 October National Day celebration, appears to have achieved

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some degree of success. Red Guard activity seems to have fallen to its lowest level since August 1966, with all posters removed from Peking streets and factories, while "business as usual" propaganda themes stress the importance of industrial production and harvest gathering. Abroad, however, Communist China continued to encounter trouble of its own making:

a. Climaxing two years of bitter conflict, the Indonesian Government on 9 October announced its decision to suspend relations, demanding reciprocal withdrawal of the 20 Chinese in Djakarta and 8 Indonesian representatives in Peking.

b. Burma, responding to a Peking threat to terminate its aid in reprisal for anti-China disturbances in Rangoon during the summer, requested on 6 October the withdrawal of all 450 propaganda-active Chinese aid technicians by the end of the month.

3. An official Yugoslav journal (GLEDISTA, joint organ of Belgrade University and the Serbian Young Communist Central Committee) published a clear and persuasive call for a two-party system for Yugoslavia, spelling out its indictment of the evils of the unchecked monopoly of power in Yugoslavia's one-party dictatorship.

4. Castro's revolutionary objectives in Latin America were dealt a severe blow in the Bolivian back-country by the Bolivian army which killed Che Guevara, captured a handful of other Cuban infiltrators, and practically liquidated the Communist guerrilla movement in that country. It is agreed by all observers, including Castro's ideologist Regis Debray (still on trial in Bolivia), that the primary cause for the failure was the non-revolutionary attitude of the Bolivian peasants.

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REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, Algiers
30 September 1967

FLN: Let Us Vietnamize the Middle East

"The United Nations inability to enforce its resolutions is too well known for us to trust in the international community's pious wishes. If we advocate guerrilla warfare and Vietnamizing the conflict, it is because our means are limited and this is the only manner of battle we can presently contemplate.

The first principle of Vietnamization is to rely on one's own force, to count on one's own firepower and determination. Commitment to a cause demands every sacrifice to achieve the objectives of that cause.

We must strive to intensify guerrilla activity on this side of the Jordan, in the Golan hills, in the Sinai, and in Israeli territory properly speaking. This does not mean we believe guerrilla warfare is enough to liberate Palestine, but simply that attrition and an intensification of the armed struggle must, together with classic warfare, form an indispensable linking of forces."

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MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, Cairo
29 September 1967

WPC Mission Calls for Arab War if UN Fails

Damascus -- If the United Nations fails to reach a just political solution for the Middle East crisis, the only solution left to the Arabs for regaining sovereignty over their usurped territories would be to launch a war for the sake of peace. This was stated by Romesh Chandra, secretary of the World Peace Council (WPC), in an interview with MENA. Chandra expressed the belief that peace will not prevail in the area unless Israel withdraws unconditionally to the positions it occupied prior to 5 June.

Chandra, who is visiting Syria as head of WPC, added: We are very concerned about Israel's announcement of its intention to establish three colonies in the occupied Arab territory. We will appeal to all peace organizations to thwart such an intention immediately.

Chandra stated that the mission is visiting Syria and a number of other Arab countries to express the council's solidarity with the Arab people's struggle to eliminate the effects of the aggression. It will also acquaint itself with the conditions of the refugees who came from the occupied territory and find out what help the council can offer them.

The WPC, he said, will meet in Delhi 11-14 November to express support for the Arab peoples and manifest world opinion's solidarity with the Arab struggle to eliminate the effects of aggression. A number of committees will be formed by the conference in Delhi, he said, to discuss the causes, roots, and results of the aggression.

Chandra added that the WPC mission will submit a report to the WPC Presidential Board, which will meet in New Delhi about the end of October. The report will later be published in various languages and distributed throughout the world.

EXCERPTS

Arab News Media Blamed For Israeli Victory

Tunis -- The Tunisian secretary of state for information told the opening session of the 13-nation Arab information ministers conference in Bizerte yesterday that verbal excess in Arab information media has become so great that no one any longer pays more than slight attention to what we have to say.

Chedli Klibi, speaking to some 100 delegates from 13 Arab countries and the Arab League, delivered an impassioned plea for an end to rhetoric and inflamed oratory in Arab information media. He said this oratory has led our peoples so far astray that they cannot conceive of reality and its problems except through a veil of passion concealing a truth which can no longer be grasped. We have gone so far in verbal excess that words cannot carry out their natural function.

The Tunisian minister said the fact that the Bizerte conference is taking place proves that we are all aware that the whole Arab information system has failed. Tunisian sources said on the eve of the opening session that it was time to bury the destructive hatchet which information has become in the Arab world. It is felt in Tunis that the Arab defeat by the Israelis last June, both militarily and politically, is largely the result of the bankruptcy, the irrelevancies, the extravagances, and the extremism of Arab news media.

Tunisia's goal at the Bizerte talks, these souces said, would be a complete reform of information in the Arab world and a drive for objectivity, moderation, and efficiency to make information an instrument of cooperation and detente in the Arab world and one of the best available weapons of the just Palestinian cause.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 October 1967

Arabs restyle propaganda front

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bizerte, Tunisia

Thirteen Arab countries in a conference here Sept. 27-30 hammered out a new plan for the Arab propaganda and information effort in the world.

It calls for dropping what Tunisian sources call "vain and empty polemics" against Israel and between Arab governments.

This subject is especially delicate here. In the past, other Arab states, especially the United Arab Republic and Syria, have accused Tunisian President Bourguiba of "treachery" and worse because of his hard-headed views of Arab and Arab-Israeli problems.

President Bourguiba lunched with the delegates at his palace in Carthage Sept. 29 and congratulated them on the "positive results" of the conference.

The new Arab information plan, not yet published at this writing, is understood to recommend much heavier use of modern mass communications and commercial public-relations media than Arab governments have made in the past.

Its philosophy, as described by a member of Tunisian Information Minister Chadly Klibi's staff, is "to tell the Arabs the plain truth about the world, and to tell the world the truth about the Arabs."

In his remarks to the delegates in Carthage, President Bourguiba said a major reason for the Arab defeat in the war with Israel last June was "bad use of Arab information media."

"It is not enough to have the right on your side," said the President. "You have to know how to defend this right."

Since 1965 Mr. Bourguiba has been urging the Arabs to abandon bellicose propaganda against Israel and seek instead to put the Jewish state on the defensive through step-by-step diplomatic pressure, as Tunisia did during its struggle for independence from France.

He has also urged the Arabs to recognize that Israel's existence is a fact they must learn to live with. Palestinian Arabs should negotiate with Israel, if necessary with backing from Arab governments, he has said.

The decision to revamp Arab information activities was made by a permanent committee of Arab information experts formed in Cairo last July after the defeat by Israel.

Subcommittee formed

Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon formed the subcommittee drafting working papers for the Bizerte meeting, the fifth conference of Arab information ministers. The conference chairmen were Arab League secretary-general Abdelkhalek Hassouna, and Tunisian Information Minister Chadly Klibi. Syria's representative, Ahmed Medinine, Information Ministry secretary-general, argued against a "moderate" approach. In line with the Damascus policy of "popular liberation war," he asked Arab information media to step up attacks not only on Israel but also on its "Anglo-American allies."

He was voted down after arguments that the Khartoum Arab summit decision of Sept. 1 — which Syria does not recognize — stressed the need for a peaceful Middle East solution.

Algerian Information Minister Ahmed Ben Yahia voted with Syria but did not actively plead its case.

Moroccan, Tunisian, and Jordanian delegates strongly criticized past propaganda activities of Ahmed Shukairy, chief of the extremist Palestine Liberation Organization.

"Mr. Shukairy's inflammatory nonsense about killing Jews and pushing Israel into the sea has been Israel's best propaganda arm against us," said one delegate.

Action, the organ of Tunisia's ruling Socialist Destourian Party, ironically contrasted the worldwide image of the typical Israeli as an attractive young kibbutz pioneer "radiating simplicity and vigor" with that of the Arab as "a turbaned feudalist with an ugly and aggressive face, ready to liquidate his own brother and destroy his neighbor."

Through superior propaganda, the editorial said, Israel has also succeeded in creating among ordinary people everywhere "the picture of a tiny state seeking to preserve its existence against the hostility of pitiless neighbors."

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Jeune Afrique, Paris
20 Août 1967

L'ERE DE LA DE-NKRUMAHISATION

Comment barrer définitivement la route à Nkrumah ? D'une manière générale, le nouveau régime se définit par opposition à la politique de Nkrumah.

Dans le domaine de l'idéologie et de la politique générale, il a procédé à un renversement total de la situation telle qu'elle existait sous ce dernier, ouvrant les portes du pays aux puissances occidentales et, en même temps, manifestant sa méfiance et son hostilité à l'égard de l'Est. Socialisme et panafricanisme, ces vieux rêves nkrumahistes, sont en train d'agoniser. On encense à présent le capitalisme. Les camps d'entrainement où des instructeurs chinois enseignaient la guerilla aux combattants de la liberté venus de Rhodésie, d'Afrique du Sud et d'autres pays africains dont les gouvernements n'acceptaient pas l'obédience de Nkrumah, ont été fermés depuis belle lurette. Les Chinois et les Cubains sont devenus très discrets à Accra. Les écoles ont reçu l'ordre de dissoudre l'organisation des « Jeunes pionniers », dans les rangs desquels les tout jeunes Ghanéens apprenaient le catéchisme nkrumahiste. Les « Jeunes pionniers » ont été remplacés par un mouvement de type anglais : les Boys Scouts.

Les changements dans le domaine économique ont été encore plus spectaculaires. Inefficacité et incompétence d'une part, corruption des cadres d'autre part, ont eu des répercussions très graves sur l'économie du temps de Nkrumah. Néanmoins, sous son régime, il y a eu des tentatives de planification et d'industrialisation destinées à faire de ce pays, voué fatalement à la monoculture du cacao, un pays économiquement libre. Il y a également eu quelques tentatives, timides il est vrai, de nationalisation de l'économie du pays.

Les projets économiques majeurs dont l'initiative avait été prise par l'ancien régime n'ont pas disparu : les usines, la puissante usine hydro-électrique sur la Volta, la nouvelle ville industrielle, Tema. Mais, aujourd'hui, les priorités économiques sont totalement différentes de ce qu'elles étaient. Devant le montant écrasant des dettes extérieures, le nouveau régime a décidé de freiner le développement économique.

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Sensitive Passages Excluded from "Pravda" Version of Tito Article

On 6 October Pravda reprinted a censored version of an article by Tito in praise of the October Revolution, that had been published originally in the Yugoslav weekly Kommunist of 14 September and in the Yugoslav daily Borba the same day. Kommunist and Borba described the article as Tito's introduction to a book entitled "The USSR, Country of the October Revolution", by "Soviet and Yugoslav authors." The abridged version appeared in Pravda as simply an article by Tito, with no indications of its antecedents.

Allusions in the original article to the anti-Yugoslav policies of Stalin and the Comintern are not included in the Pravda version. A passage in the Yugoslav version in which Tito writes "our relations with the USSR have passed through different phases" is omitted, as is Tito's observation that after "overcoming the difficulties produced by Stalin's policy, these relations have developed steadily in the interests of both sides." The resulting picture of 25 years of harmony is tempered only in muted fashion by the retention of stock references to "equal rights" and "noninterference" as spelled out in the Belgrade and Moscow declarations of 1955 and 1956 -- the documents which sanctioned Belgrade's embarcation on a separate road to socialism.

While the Pravda article includes Tito's remark that his party "was among the first in Europe which ... advocated the joining of the Third--Leninist--International," it does not include Tito's complaint in the original article that after receiving considerable support from the Comintern, the Yugoslav party subsequently "came into a situation when it would have almost been disbanded by the leadership of the same Comintern."

The Pravda article retains Tito's justification of the Yugoslav "workers' self-management" system through his invocation of Lenin's dicta that "It is important for us to enlist every one of the working people in the administration of the state" and that "socialism cannot be created by a minority party."

Tito's statement that "today's reality shows that socialism cannot be anyone's monopoly" is included in Pravda, but omitted is questioning of bloc presumptions to leadership of socialist development in emerging countries implicit in Tito's original passage reading "Possibilities were also created, for the buildup of socialism in smaller countries independently of the attitude of the leaders of socialist countries toward socialist developments in other countries."

A long passage was omitted recalling various visits Tito made to the USSR since 1917, including his visit in January 1967. The latter had been apparently a stormy one, and a large portion of the omissions are editing out of phrases and sentences reflecting the strains which developed in

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Yugoslav-Soviet relations early this year over Moscow's barbs at what the Soviets viewed as a downgrading of the party's role in Yugoslav affairs.

Also absent from the Pravda version is Tito's concluding prediction of future progress in the epoch ushered in by the October Revolution "regardless of the difficulties inflicted upon socialist development by conservative notions and inadequate methods within its own ranks."

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Communists Rebut Castro-Debray Theories of Revolution

The death of Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia on October 8 came in the midst of arguments among communists over the role of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. The arguments, which have appeared with increasing frequency in the communist press, reflect the struggle going on between Castroite elements and the orthodox, communist parties. Guevara was killed when the band of Bolivian guerrillas he led was defeated by the Bolivian army. The defeat of those Bolivian guerrillas, as much as the death of Che Guevara, is pertinent to the debate that has been going on among Latin American Communists.

Last summer Castro accused the orthodox communists of being "pseudo-revolutionaries" for dragging their feet on immediate armed struggle, the theme of the 1st conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), held in Havana, August 1967. Many of the orthodox Latin American Communists opposed the convening of LASO, and their distrust of the Castroites appeared justified when Castro told the conference: "There is a much broader movement on this continent than the movement composed simply of the communist parties in Latin America .... a guerrilla movement is called upon to be the nucleus of a revolutionary movement." Castro put his competitive challenge into specifics by referring to frictions between the city-based orthodox Communist parties, looking to proletariat support, and the guerrilla bands tied to the countryside. A guerrilla movement, he said, cannot be directed from the city and attempts to do so in the past have been a source of failure.

The issues Castro raised at LASO were already being argued before the Conference began. They had been stated more forcefully and elaborately in a pamphlet published in Havana in 1966 entitled "Revolution Within the Revolution?", written by Regis Debray, a French Marxist and journalist. In his pamphlet, Debray undermined the doctrine of party supremacy by saying that in the current Latin American situation a guerrilla force is itself the vanguard of the party and therefore a Latin American revolutionary need not have a formal relationship with the party at this time.

One of the first serious polemics replying to Debray's pamphlet came from the Argentine Communist Party, which, following its 7th national conference in April 1967, issued a pamphlet called "There Cannot Be a Revolution with the Revolution" which took Debray to task for downgrading the role of thw working class and "spreading ideas harmful to the revolutionary movement." The tract assailed Debray for violating the tenets of Leninism: "For Lenin, the city moves the rural areas; for Debray, the latter lead the city." It went on to charge Debray with harboring "antiproletarian sentiments" and slandering the Soviet Union as well as the Argentine Communist Party.

Moscow, in keeping with its usual policy of circumspection in responding to Cuban heresies, replied only obliquely to Debray's theses, never

referring to him or the Cubans directly. A Moscow commentator said on a broadcast that was beamed eight times to Cuba during June, that before a "revolutionary situation" could be converted into a revolution, there must be "a strong political party able to direct the revolutionary movement and capable of helping the working class to take the revolution to victory."

Another Moscow commentator, Vitaliy Korionov, wrote an article for Pravda, June 5, praising the Latin American Communist parties and ending with the pointed conclusion that "Communists have today won such positions that nothing in the world may be resolved without their participation." This article, too, was repeated over Radio Moscow for Cuban and Latin American audiences. It was not the first time Korionov had lectured Havana from his Pravda podium: on March 10 Korionov wrote that "any underestimation" of the role of the Latin American Communist parties or any activities "weakening and splitting" party ranks would cause "irremediable damage" to the interest of Latin American peoples.

The East European Communists have been more outspoken about Debray and Castro. On August 18, the Czechoslovak party daily, Rude Pravo, lambasted the Debray pamphlet and gave publicity to the Argentine polemic in an article signed by the paper's Latin American correspondent, Victor Perez. Perez says that Debray proposes an immediate armed stuggle by guerrilla "foci" which "without the party or a clearcut ideology, will generate a socialist consciousness." Perez assails this thesis as a "militaristic interpretation of the revolutionary process."

Just prior to the LASO conference there was some effort to smooth over the dispute and establish a common front of revolutionary forces that would recognize the preeminence in each country of the regular Communist party. The effort emanated from the orthodox Communists. From Moscow, Tass lent its support by publicizing their efforts. On July 11, Tass reported the Argentine and Brazilian parties had called for a return to the decisions of the 1964 conference of Latin American parties' on July 13, Tass reported the Colombian and Venezuelan parties had called for a new meeting of Latin American Communist parties; and on July 25 Moscow publicized the efforts of the Brazilian and Uruguayan parties to call a new conference of Latin American Communist parties. The evident aim of such a meeting, like the one in November 1964, would be to deal with divisions in party ranks, and as a little summit, it would enjoy greater prestige than the LASO conference which was to be a gathering of revolutionary forces, some of which existed more in name than in numbers.

The Castroites replied to these efforts by attacking the Argentine and Brazilian parties in the Cuban magazine, Theory and Practice, and by sharply criticizing those who were calling for a new meeting of hemisphere parties on a Havana television symposium broadcast shortly before the LASO conference, on July 20. The same television program discussed the thorny problem of representation and accreditation to LASO, and Haydee

Santamaria, Cuban chairman of the LASO organizing committee, admitted that some of the "observers" from the "socialist countries" might "view the conference with pleasure and others with less pleasure." This plain reference to the Soviets and East Europeans did not provoke a reply from Moscow, but nor did Moscow publicize in any way the two observers sent by the USSR to the conference. Yugoslavia, however, was more openly hostile, and the Belgrade press commented on August 1 that many of the participants in the LASO conference were "quite unknown personalities, who are appearing on behalf of groups ... which have no influence in their own countries."

On the eve of the LASO conference, Moscow made its most open move in support of the orthodox Communists and in criticism of the Castroites by reprinting in Pravda, July 30, a long article by Luis Corvalan (Secretary General of the Chilean Communist Party) which had appeared a few weeks earlier in the July issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. In the article, Corvalan tactfully acknowledged the existence of an "ideological struggle" in Latin America and urged a "fraternal dialogue" and "unity of action" on the divergent trends. He also urged that decisions as to revolutionary tactics be left to the judgment of Communist party leaders in each country. Corvalan referred to the two revolutionary trends in Latin America as "the proletariat" and the "petty bourgeoisie", and made it quite plain that it was the Cubans he meant as the "petty bourgeoisie" trend. "The petty bourgeoisie revolutionary current", he said, generally "underrates the proletariat and the communist parties, is more disposed toward nationalism, adventurism and terrorism, and sometimes permits anticommunist and anti-Soviet attitudes." Corvalan also replied to the arguments in Debray's pamphlet by admonishing:

> "A vanguard cannot be created arbitrarily ... around a leader or around people who individually adopt most radical -- in any case this is what they think -- positions and are preparing some type or other of revolutionary actions. Exceptions to this rule do not disprove it. The vanguard emerges as a result of the merger of Marxism and the workers' movement ... and of the application of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of each country, that is, as a result of purposeful activity and not of a spontaneous process."

The LASO conference concluded, as Castro had planned, on a demand for guerrilla wars throughout Latin America, echoing Che Guevara's call for several Vietnams to drain the strength of the United States. However orthodox opposition was not stilled. In September, Gerardo Unzueta, one of the leaders of the Mexican Communist Party, publicly attacked Debray's theories in a tract called "Fraud Within the Revolution," and branded Debray a bourgeois reformer. On September 25, a correspondent of the Yugoslav agency Tanyug reported from Mexico City that the Mexican Communist Party had completely disassociated itself from the decisions

of the LASO conference and called anew for a meeting of the Latin American Communist parties to consider the question of unity within the continental workers' movement.

Now that both Guevara and Debray have met with defeat it remains to be seen how much appeal Castro will have in the future.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1967

Soviet Bases in the Middle East

Attention has focused on the scope and objectives of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East as a result of last summer's Arab-Israeli war. Soviet intentions are a key factor in understanding that conflict and the re-arming of the Arab nations which ensued. They are also a key factor in interpreting the persistent reports of the establishment of Soviet military bases in the area.

Stated in the most general terms, the Soviet objectives are to expand the USSR's influence in the Middle East and, with the aid of nationalistic and revolutionary Arab regimes, to reduce or eliminate the Western position in the area. Beyond that the Soviets undoubtedly dream of the eventual Communization of the Middle East, but they realistically recognize that at present the Arab people simply do not accept Communism and therefore the Soviets will concentrate rather on pushing the more radical Arab states into more extreme anti-Western positions and more orthodox socialist configurations.

The method the Soviets have found to be most effective for furthering their objectives in the Middle East has plainly been military aid. Over the past decade the USSR supplied military equipment estimated to be worth over $2 billion to the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. This consisted of a wide variety of ground, sea, and air armaments. In addition, the USSR supplied extensive training and technical assistance. It is believed that over 6,000 Arab military personnel have been trained in the Soviet Union, and in recent years as many as 900 Soviet military advisers were active in Egypt, 550 in Algeria, 175 in Syria and approximately 100 in Iraq. Most of these advisers worked at training camps, but the Arab-Israeli war revealed that Soviet officers were also directly attached to combat forces in Syria, and perhaps elsewhere as well.

The war severely damaged the Arab armed forces and resulted in the destruction or capture of a large percentage of the Soviet-supplied armaments. This was particularly true of Egypt and Syria, whereas Iraqi and Algerian forces suffered few losses. As is well known, the Soviets began to re-supply the defeated Arab armies immediately after the cease-fire. Once the immediate emergency was over, the Soviet supply operation was gradually reduced, but is nevertheless continuing on a large scale.

The difficulties of this re-supply operation pointed out the necessity for the Soviets to build and maintain supply points in the Middle East area so that future requirements can be handled more expeditiously and with less disruption to Soviet transport facilities. Such supply bases could also be used by the Soviets to support their naval forces in the area if hostilities should impede normal supply routes from their Black Sea naval bases.

(Cont.)

In re-assessing their prestige after the end of hostilities, the Soviets found that their position had been damaged, but not fatally, and that certain advantages could be drawn from the Arab defeat. Foremost was the fact that the radical Arab governments needed arms more than ever -- to replace the losses -- and had no other source for obtaining them. Furthermore, there would be scapegoats in the Arab world for the defeat and the Soviets were in a position to demand that the blame be settled on those who had opposed them in the past; the ensuing purge in Egypt (which is not yet over) also permitted to get friends of the Soviets into positions of power. Those leaders who stayed in power came more under Soviet influence as a result of their indebtedness for the new arms and as a result of the elevation of Soviet sympathizers around them. Thus there were good reasons for the Soviets to rearm some Arab states and certainly their long-term ambitions in the region had not changed.

However, the Soviets also realize that they face a basic dilemma in their arming of the Arabs: on the one hand the most effective means of getting and keeping the Arab nationalist leaders on their side is to furnish them arms; on the other hand this risks a renewed outbreak of war in the Middle East. In order to resolve this dilemma, the Soviets will obviously make every possible effort to expand their influence and control over the Arab military forces. It is to be expected that the Soviet training missions will be enlarged and strengthened in the course of re-building the defeated armies of Syria and Egypt; the purpose of the training missions will be not only to train the Arabs but to indoctrinate and develop influence control over them. It is also to be expected that the Soviets will attempt to infiltrate Soviet advisors into the Arab military forces for this same purpose. These activities will in turn require the establishment of Soviet training bases, which can also serve as supply points, as mentioned above. It is unlikely that the Soviet bases will be formal military bases, resulting from formal treaties ceding parcels of land to the Soviet Union for a fixed period of time, since the Soviets are fully conscious of the complications which might result over the years from such fixed obligations in Arab countries which in are constant change. Moreover, the establishment of formal bases would deflate their strident criticism of foreign bases maintained by the Western powers. Therefore the Soviet bases are more likely to be combined with existing military bases, airfields, and harbors. By the very extent of their operations, they will almost exclusively occupy certain parts of these installations which will then constitute de facto bases.

There have been persistent reports of Soviet pressures on the Arab governments for such installations. Most recent reports have centered on Yemen, which is being evacuated by the Egyptian forces which have been there for five years battling the Saudi Arabian-supported royalist government. The Yemen republican forces have been negotiating with the Soviet government, offering rights at the military base at Hays, midway on the Hudaydah-Ta'iz road and at the large airport at Janad near

the capital, in exchange for armaments to be supplied directly to them by the Soviets. The Soviet Union published an extraordinary denial of these reports in Izvestiya on 11 August 1967; but the article went on to admit that "Various enterprises which help to strengthen the independent economy of that country have been or are being built in Yemen with the participation of Soviet specialists." Of course the Soviets would view the improvement of the Janad airfield to handle heavy Soviet military planes as "strengthening the economy" of Yemen.

Other reports have discussed the heavy concentration of Soviet advisers and technicians in Syria. It is said that the Soviets have built, or are building, major installations at the Dayr Al-Zur military airport and at the civilian airport at Aleppo. A major Soviet military training activity at Dayr Al-Zawr is being expanded into a Soviet supply and operations base, according to one news article. The Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean have regularly used the Egyptian naval base in Alexandria for supply purposes. In addition, there has been a fairly large Soviet naval training force there to assist in the development of the Egyptian navy and train it in the use of Soviet equipment. Since the Arab-Israeli conflict, there has been a resurgence of speculation in the press that the Soviets are building a submarine base in or near Alexandria to be used by their own ships as well as by those given to Egypt. If this is the case, it if presumed that the Soviets will claim that this is a project to "improve the Eygptian economy."

Press Trust of India (PTI) Dispatch

USSR Reported Seeking Arab Military Bases

Khartoum, 3 September 1967 -- The Soviet Union is seeking military bases in West Asia, according to sources close to the Arab summit which has just ended here, writes Wilfred Lazarus, PTI Staff correspondent.

Moscow has sounded out some Arab countries on the possibility of obtaining bases, these sources said. To Arab criticism that the Soviet Union had not come to their aid in the recent Middle East war, Moscow is said to have told certain Arab capitals that the USSR could not rush to their aid because of lack of bases to operate from.

While the United States had a string of bases dotting the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union had difficulty maintaining a fleet in the Mediterranean to keep a watch on the American Fleet. Besides, Russia has to give advance notice to Turkey before reinforcements can move through the Dardanelles. This has helped the West to know the nature of Soviet armor being moved, the Soviet Union has pointed out.

Moscow has also clearly indicated that if the Arabs in the future expect military assistance from the Soviet Union in the event of any threat, they should be prepared to provide bases for the Soviet defense services to operate from.

Meanwhile, Western pressure has been mounting on the Arabs, and they are becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and other East European countries for the supply of arms.

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko is expected here soon to discuss military collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Sudan. About one hundred Sudanese military personnel are to go to Moscow shortly to get training in the use of new Soviet arms bding introduced for the first time in the Sudanese Army. Several Soviet military delegations have visited many Arab capitals in recent weeks, including Yemen and Iraq.

HINDUSTAN TIMES, New Delhi
4 September 1967

Sudan leader suggests indirect talks

Khartoum, Sept. 3 (UNI-ANSA) —Former Sudanese Prime Minister and present leader of the Opposition, Mr Sadik el-Mahdi, has expressed the hope of indirect negotiations with Israel for the evacuation of occupied Arab territory.

Indirect negotiations on this basis could bring a "relative peace" to the Middle East—he

Mr Mahdi said the summit was a "limited success" in so far as it symbolized the unity of the Arab peoples.

He offered three possible solutions to the crisis: 1) maintaining the status quo with a view to the evacuation of Arab territories by Israeli; 2) recognition of Israel in exchange; and 3) liberation of the Arab territories by force.

Mr Mahdi believed the status quo was the best.

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The Saudi Arabian Government has decided to resume oil shipment to hte U.S. and Britain, calling off an 11-week ban which followed the Arab-Israeli war in June, Mecca Radio reported on Friday.

The radio said the decision was taken in conformity with a resolution announced at the Arab summit conference.

IZVESTIYA, Moscow
11 August 1967

"A Retort to a DAILY MIRROR Canard"

by V. Borisov

The bourgeois press which abounds with false sensations has once more distinguished itself. Recently the London DAILY MIRROR informed the readers that, allegedly, "Russia offered to supply military equipment to the Yemeni Republic in exchange for a military air base." This report, which is false from the beginning to the end, was allegedly datelined from Aden.

The good relations between the Soviet Union and the Yemeni Republic give no peace to the Western imperialist circles. Meeting the aspirations of the Yemeni people, our country really is rendering help to the young republic. Various enterprises which help to strengthen the independent economy of that country have been or are being built in Yemen with the participation of Soviet specialists.

This is known in England as it is everywhere else. The DAILY MIRROR knows it as well as the other newspapers which picked up its "canard." But these organs of the "free press" have a definite order to fill: on the one hand to divert by any means the attention of the world public from the events in Aden where the British colonizers are committing brutalities; and on the other hand the authors of this insinuation want to add fuel to the fire with a view to the complex situation around the Yemeni problem.

How some gentlemen in London love to juggle with facts!

IZVESTIYA
11 August 1967

РЕПЛИКА УТКА «ДЕЙЛИ МИРРОР»

Щедрая на лживые сенсации буржуазная печать вновь отличилась. Лондонская «Дейли миррор» на днях оповестила читателей, что, мол, «Россия предложила поставить Йеменской Республике военное оборудование в обмен на военно-воздушную базу». Лживое от начала до конца это сообщение пришло якобы из Адена.

Добрые отношения между Советским Союзом и Йеменской Республикой не дают покоя империалистическим кругам Запада. Наша страна, идя навстречу чаяниям народа Йемена, действительно оказывает помощь молодой республике. При участии советских специалистов в Йемене построены и строятся различные предприятия, которые способствуют укреплению независимой экономики этой страны.

В Англии об этом знают так же, как и повсюду. «Дейли миррор» и другие газеты, которые подхватили ее «утку»,— тоже. Но эти органы «свободной печати» имеют определенный заказ. С одной стороны, чем угодно отвлечь внимание мировой общественности от событий в Адене, где зверствуют британские колонизаторы. С другой стороны, авторы этой инсинуации хотят подбросить углей в костер, имея в виду сложную обстановку вокруг йеменской проблемы.

До чего же некоторые лондонские господа любят передергивать факты.

В. БОРИСОВ.

CEYLON DAILY NEWS
5 September 1967

Russians exert increased pressure on Arabs

BEIRUT, Monday

Informed circles here, supported by reports emanating from the Arab summit conference in Khartoum, indicate that the Soviet authorities have been exerting increased pressure on Arab leaders over important issues relating to military policy and armaments.

It is an open secret in the Arab world that Soviet diplomacy had been using all the instrumentalities at its command to win certain concessions from the Arabs in exchange for Soviet re-supply of military equipment destroyed by or lost to the Israelis in June.

These concessions are increased placement of Russian officers at key spots in the UAR army, and the purging Arab armies, particularly the of "bourgeoise elements" among the UAR officer corp.

The latter point in particular appears to be a clear Soviet objective, and a steadily accelerating propaganda and political action campaign has been unfolding for some time with the purpose of discrediting senior officers of certan Arab armies notably the UAR.

The Arabs on their side have been studying the whole question of Soviet military re-supply in the light of their recent bitter experience with Israel and apparently in quite another perspective from that of Soviet diplomacy.

Cost of war

The Israeli war cost the UAR approximately two billion dollars of which only half had been paid by the UAR. Arab experts are relatively unimpressed therefore by Soviet efforts to place the entire blame for this disaster on the inadequacy of Arab military leadership.

They do not dispute that Arab military leadership was indeed faulty and contributed importantly to the fiasco. They merely think that other factors also deserve consideration, one of these being the demonstrated inferiority of Russian military equipment.

Some Arab experts regard the attempts to fix all the blame on deficiencies in the Arab military leadership as indicative of a Soviet desire to turn attention away from the question of the actual performance of Soviet equipment under fire. Much of this equipment the Arabs note was of World War II vintage and not adaptable to desert warfare.

Handicapped

Arab armies were handicapped by the fact that Soviet equipment manuals were often in Russian, with faulty English translations when translations were available at all.

The Algerians have also found that Soviet trucks are fragile and used fuel at enormous rates; and they are in the process of replacing them with British diesel engines.

Russian instructors in Arab armies have also continued to teach World War II doctrines, including the use of armour as fixed artillery.

It is this sort of consideration that is causing some Arab military leaders to examine closely the advice now tendered by Russian military authorities, as it is felt that accepting this advice will in effect grant the Soviet Union the right to purge Arab armies and impose a permanent presence of Soviet military officers, in numbers, in the Arab armies.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 August 1967

Soviet Said to Ask For Base in Yemen

By Agence France-Presse

ADEN, Aug. 7 — The Soviet Union was reported today to have asked to establish a military base in republican-controlled territory in Yemen.

The report said the Soviet Union had offered the regime of President Abdullah al-Salal direct military aid in exchange for facilities at the airport of Janad, about 14 miles from Sana, the republican capital.

If the report is true and if Brigadier al-Salal accepts the proposal, it would mean that Moscow would have won its first military foothold in the South Arabian Peninsula with possibly far-reaching political repercussions.

The Soviet Union was said to have made the proposal during a visit to Moscow by the republican Deputy Premier, Abdullah Guezilan.

Until now, Soviet military aid to the republicans has been channeled through Cairo, which has been backing the Yemeni Government in the civil war against royalists, who are supported by Saudi Arabia. One aim of Mr. Guezilan's visit was reported to be to persuade Moscow to supply the aid directly.

Observers here believe the report is part of a bid by Brigadier al-Salal to strengthen his position in a dispute with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, who, acording to reliable sources here, plans to oust the Yemeni leader soon.

It was believed that the Yemeni President thought that Cairo would be less inclined to depose him if he were to become directly involved with Moscow.

The observers said that Brigadier al-Salal's ouster, would remove an obstacle to ending the five-year-old Yemeni civil war. At the meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Khartoum, the Sudan, last week, the Egyptian representative declared that President Nasser wanted to end the war.

BALTIMORE SUN
9 October 1967

Red Fleet Grows In Mediterranean

By THOMAS T. FENTON
[Rome Bureau of The Sun]

Naples, Oct. 8 — The Soviet Union has finally realized the old Czarist dream of reaching a sea with warm-water ports.

Since the Middle East war, the Russians have established themselves as a major naval power in the Mediterranean Sea.

Maintaining their new Mediterranean Fleet through a system of "mobile bases," they appear to have every intention of remaining here indefinitely.

For almost two decades, the 50 ships and 200 aircraft of the United States 6th Fleet were the only major naval force in the Mediterranean.

Began Modestly In 1964

In 1964, the Russians began a modest and unpublicized deployment of warships into the Mediterranean from their Baltic and Black Sea fleets. In June, the small Soviet Mediterranean fleet was suddenly doubled.

The Russians now patrol in the Mediterranean with an average of 40 ships, including submarines and the latest guided missile cruisers and destroyers.

The fledgeling Russian fleet still lacks the aircraft it would need to match the 6th Fleet in firepower.

But in the peacetime game of showing the flag and "gunboat diplomacy," it already rivals the Americans'.

Show Of Support To Arabs

Beginning July 10, a Soviet naval force of twelve warships visited Egypt as a show of support for the Arabs and a warning to the Israelis.

During the two months that Soviet naval forces were in Alexandria and Port Said, there were no clashes along the upper half of the Suez Canal. As soon as the Russians left, fighting broke out between the Israeli and Egyptian armies along the upper canal.

The 6th Fleet, on the other hand, is barred from Arab waters. There are no ports at which it can now call in either the Middle East or North Africa. Even once-friendly Beirut is closed to the American fleet.

Cruiser, Subs, Destroyers

The Soviet force now being maintained in the Mediterranean includes a cruiser—at the moment a Sverdlov-class guided missile cruiser—eight to ten attack submarines along with ten to twelve surface combatant vessels.

The latter include the latest Kynda and Kashin-class destroyers. They carry guided missiles which could be nuclear-tipped.

The submarines, all from the Baltic Fleet because the Montreux Convention prohibits deployment of Russian submarines from the Black Sea fleet, stay in the Mediterranean from 40 to 110 days before being rotated. The average deployment of surface ships is 60 days.

Like U.S. Fleet Without Bases

Borrowing an American idea, the Russians maintain this fleet without Mediterranean bases. The fleet uses what amounts to "mobile bases."

A steady procession of oilers, tugs, tenders and other support ships follows the fleet to the anchorages it has established from one end of the Mediterranean to the other—all of them in international waters.

During NATO fleet exercises last week, Soviet destroyers steamed alongside United States carriers an ddestroyers. The Mediterranean is no longer an American sea.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 August 1967

Saudis Alarmed by Soviet and Suspicious of Egypt in Yemen

By THOMAS F. BRADY
Special to The New York Times

JIDDA, Saudi Arabia, Aug. 12 —Reports from Aden that the Soviet Union is seeking the right to use a Yemeni airfield for military aircraft landings have aroused alarm in the Government-controlled press here.

This reaction is coupled with what appears to be deep suspicion of the new Egyptian proposal for a negotiated settlement of the five-year-old war in Yemen between the forces of the United Arab Republic, which support the republicans, and the tribal guerrillas supporting the deposed Imam, a ruler.

There has been no confirmation of the Aden reports from any other quarter, and some foreign observers regard the Saudi reaciton as more significant than the report itself.

Dispatches from Aden, which followed the Cairo announcement of the proposal to withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen, said the Soviet Union wanted airport facilities in return for direct military aid to Yemen Republic, presumably to replace the Egyptian aid and Soviet aid that has come through Egyptians.

The dispatches said Moscow wanted facilities at the Janad airport on the outskirts of Sana, the Yemeni capital.

[Izvestia, the Soviet Government newspaper, denied on Friday the reports that Moscow had offered military equipment to Yemen in exchange for a base. It termed the reports a "canard."

The Saudi view, and that of most diplomatic observers, is that the republic could not withstand royalists onslaughts unless it had foreign support, while the royalists, who now are reported to have a good supply of arms and gold, could operate effectively for some time without further Saudi aid.

Consequently, the Saudis would like to see the Egyptians leave, but not to see them replaced by direct Soviet help.

The Aden reports, even if accurate, have not indicated that the Russians are offering to send troops to Yemen.

Aside from their anxiety about possible Soviet infiltration in the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudis are cool to the Egyptian proposal for a settlement in Yemen because they say, the Egyptians have failed to live up to past agreements.

The Judda pact of August, 1965, which Cairo has offered to revive, called for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops within 10 months after the establishment of a joint royalist-republican interin Government, which was to have been set up in November 1965. The Saudis charge that the Egyptians simply blocked the setting up of such a Government and then did not withdraw.

Omar Saqqaf, head of Saudi Foreign Ministry under King Faisal, who is his own Foreign Minister, said Tuesday in a radio interview that the first move in a Yemeni settlement must now be Egyptian withdrawal. Only them, he declared, would Saudi Arabia welcome a supervisory system to assure nonintervention from this country while the Yemenis worked out their own solution. But he gave no indication that a solution by force—a royalist military victory—would be ruled out.

Saudi officials admit prianxious for an Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, particularly before the British withdrawal from Aden next January leaves the Saudi southern flank exposed to Arab leftist penetration.

Though these officials say they can see possible advantages in an agreement that would permit President Gamal Abdel Nasser to pull out without losing face, they insist the Government here will make no commitment that will take royalist pressure off the Yemeni Republic and allow Mr. Nasser to gain time for action in Aden.

THE ECONOMIST
7 October 1967

Russia makes it to the warm water

Russia's navy has got a bigger toehold in the Mediterranean since the Arab-Israel war. The war was the occasion for showing the flag more conspicuously than ever before. More Russian warships than usual came through the Dardanelles to join the existing Russian squadron ; others steamed round from the Baltic via Gibraltar. The regular game of shadowing the American Sixth Fleet was played with exceptional zeal. Some 16 vessels—destroyers, submarines, guided missile ships and landing craft—spent two months from July to September in Port Said and Alexandria. When they left several others replaced them. The Russian ships ranged wider than they usually do. Algerian and Jugoslav ports have been used for shore leave.

en Malta, whose dockyards have lost a eat deal of custom through the closure of the Suez canal, was given the gladeye (but turned a pained face away).

The build-up this year has been bigger than any previously known. But it was part and parcel of a Russian policy of expansion that has been under way for at least three years. To judge by Russia's performance over the past several years, it would have sent more ships into the Mediterranean this year even if there had been no Arab-Israeli crisis. Russia's permanent squadron there is comparatively new. It owes its existence to the fact that the Russians have to some extent at last solved their supply problem. They have been using Alexandria as a supply base. But they have also created a long-range supply system, similar to the American "fleet train." They are using one very advanced supply ship and a series of floating bases—oil tankers and cargo ships anchoring in international waters. These have recently dropped anchor off Malta, Sicily, Tunisia, Cyprus, and have been seen in the Aegean.

As Russia's Mediterranean fleet grows, these floating bases may not be able to fulfil all its needs. They cannot compete with the facilities that the American Sixth Fleet gets in Spain, France and Italy. Russia has not fully overcome the loss of its Albanian base at Tirana and may, the Americans believe, be pushing out for alternatives. One suggestion is that Algeria's port at Mers el Kebir might be made available for Russian use ; but this could run into opposition from France, on which Algeria's economy depends, unless General de Gaulle continues his recent support for Russian policy in the Middle East. He might. But the Algerians themselves, though at odds with the present middle-of-the-road policies of oth A.ab countries, might hesitate to go that far. On the whole, Moscow's hopes that the Arab countries on the Mediterranean might give it facilities commensurable with those that Europe gives the Americans have receded with the Arab defeat.

Russia's enlarged naval presence in the Mediterranean has not yet vitally affected the balance of power there. The American Sixth Fleet is still far stronger. But Russia may soon be the second naval power in the area, if it is not already ; Britain has few ships left thereabouts. It marks a success for the Russians' persistent efforts to break out of the land barriers that have traditionally confined Russian naval power to the Baltic and the Black Sea. It is out into the warm waters at last. A major aim of the Tsars 90 years ago may have been achieved by Mr Kosygin.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
12 October 1967

Soviet Shores Up Yemen With Arms

By R. H. BOYCE
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

The Soviet Union is delivering arms and other military equipment to the republican regime in the Yemen in the wake of Egypt's pullout of troops which had supported that regime, Middle Eastern diplomats here said today.

Details on the volume of Soviet arms aid were unavailable, but the diplomats said the Soviet move was intended to:

• Shore up the republican Yemen President Abdullah Al-Sallal, which was seriously weakened by the Egyptian pullout.

• Offset any move by Saudi Arabia's King Faisal to reinforce the royalist faction in an attempt to return deposed Imam Al-Badr to power.

LASTED 5 YEARS

The Yemen civil war between republicans and royalists has lasted five years, with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser backing the republicans and King Faisal backing the royalists.

Egypt's severe economic disruption resulting from loss of the Arab-Israel war in June, forced Nasser to agree to pull his estimated 40,000 troops out of the Yemen. An agreement with King Faisal on the pullout was negotiated at the Arab "summit" conference in Khartoum last month.

About 22,000 of Nasser's troops are in the Yemen now. He is expected to evacuate Sana, the Yemeni capital, by Sunday, and to have the last of his troops out of the country by Dec. 15. As a face-saving gesture, Nasser has publicly stated that he is pulling out because his troops "had wiped out the specter of British imperialism" from South Arabia, which includes the Yemen.

The troops are leaving in six ships chartered from Pakistan — and paid for by Saudi Arabia.

The Yemeni republican army has little strength of its own. President Al-Sallal rejected the Khartoum agreement when it was announced, and turned quickly to Moscow for help, the diplomatic sources reported. They said Moscow's willingness to respond meant that:

• Russia recognizes Al-Sallal's weak regime would probably fall without outside aid.

• The Soviet Union now may have taken the first step in "picking up the tab" for another of Nasser's costly adventures. Russia has replaced about half the weaponry Nasser lost to Israel; whether the Kremlin would underwrite Nasser in other disaster areas has been the subject of speculation for weeks.

Al-Sallal dismissed five of his cabinet ministers for refusing to join him in scorning the Khartoum agreement. He reportedly is now forming a new government, intent on carrying on the civil war.

POWER VACUUM

Whether King Faisal will honor the Khartoum agreement still is unknown, the diplomats said. If he withdraws his support of the royalists, as he agreed, he risks a power vacuum in the Yemen that could endanger his own position. King Faisal knows that substituting Soviet power for Nasser's power in the Yemen would put further pressure on his southern flank.

King Faisal apparently agreed to the peace settlement because he wished to end the drain on his own resources which his support of the royalists cost him, just as Nasser needed to cut his losses. But with the Soviets entering the picture in Nasser's place, King Faisal may reconsider the bargain, sources said. A similar peace agreement between King Faisal and Nasser broke down in 1965.

Western diplomatic sources said, however, the mere presence of Soviet arms in the Yemen would not greatly strengthen Al-Sallal's position until the republican forces have been trained to use Soviet weaponry and that will take months.

c. The Chinese Communist regime is saddled with overwhelming reconstruction problems throughout China's school system: 1) Teachers, school administrators, Party officials concerned with education, even Cabinet Ministers (both Ministers for Education have been removed) must be found to replace the discards of the Cultural Revolution; 2) guidelines for curricula for every grade level and every type of education must be drawn up; 3) the Central Committee must evolve a workable and generally acceptable policy in connection with education throughout the mainland -- and this must be accomplished despite already existing cleavages on education between the militant (Mao-ist) and conservative wings of the Central Committee. 50X1-HUM

d. The Mao regime's hostility to intellectuality in any form has been demonstrated in a number of distressing incidents including the halting of publication of dozens of scientific and technical journals, the belittling (particularly in Cultural Revolution publications) of Western scientific advances, the open criticism of the work done by China's two leading biochemists in the synthesis of insulin, the deference once accorded learning which is given to Redness, and the derogatory way in which the very word "scholar" is now used. 50X1-HUM

e. China's leaders have obviously learned little from previous failures resulting from authoritarian educational experiments at home and abroad: in 1958 and 1959 they saw their great ally the Soviet Union attempt and then regret (and ultimately revamp) the Khrushchevian educational reforms (massive political indoctrination, stress on physical labor, curtailment of the academic year, reduction of the number of years spent in school at the middle levels); in 1958, during the Great Leap Forward, China's leaders watched helplessly as Mao's radical experiments in educational reform met with disaster. From what we know today about this most recent radical reform effort, indications are that history will repeat itself. 50X1-HUM

f. There are many countries where overseas Chinese can more readily obtain a quality education than they could on the Mainland: in countries where school admission and teaching practices honestly warrant it, such as France, Germany, Thailand, Australia and Taiwan, the advantages of a better education for overseas Chinese can be illustrated in terms of a better livelihood. On the other hand, the disadvantages of an education on the Mainland can be illustrated by wide circulation of the statements of disillusioned students upon their return from the Mainland.

History may also show how the Communist Chinese regime demonstrated the fallacy of permitting short-term political gains to jeopardize the continuity of scholarship. It is doubtful that any political gain could justify the squandering of a commodity as precious as the sound education of a nation's youth. 50X1-HUM

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

November 1967

Education and the Cultural Revolution

On June 13th 1966 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ordered China's schools closed "in order to carry out the Cultural Revolution thoroughly and completely reform the educational system." In releasing the student body of the entire country the regime loosed more than 20 million young people from 15 universities, 48 engineering colleges, 31 agricultural colleges, numerous lesser institutions of higher learning, and countless numbers of primary and middle schools. A great percentage of these youths, freed from the discipline of the classroom, have since then roamed the country fighting with workers and peasants, party cadres, the army and against one another.

The motivating force behind these students activities has been the Red Guard movement launched by Chairman Mao Tse-tung to help carry out his Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards came into being at the middle school of Tsinghua University in Peking on 29 May 1966 following the formation of a so-called "pioneer movement." The Red Guard (at first 1700 strong at Tsinghua) had been organized to start a rebellion at the university in August 1966 (according to a New China News Agency [NCNA] dispatch of 12 October 1966). They marched to the university carrying portraits of Mao Tse-tung and the now familiar placards containing quotations from Mao, pulled down the old gate, demanding that a statue of Mao be placed in its stead, and insisted that Tsinghua be made into a new type of university for learning Mao's thought. The middle school Red Guards, inspired by the example of their Red Guard elders, demoted their principal and eight teachers to school servants.

This pattern subsequently repeated itself in schools and universities throughout China; professors and teachers were humiliated to the extent that many were driven to suicide. For example, in Lanchow University, which had a staff of 1157 people, 380 suffered at the hands of the Red Guard to the extent that 61 were "persecuted to death or ran away", 6 were "compelled to kill themselves" and 14 made "unsuccessful suicide attempts leaving some completely disabled" (reported by the Peking Daily on 19 February 1967). Other forms of persecution during those days included parading teachers before their students wearing dunce caps and placards proclaiming their alleged errors, and forcing them to abase themselves by public self-criticism. Others were forced to perform the most menial chores.

In addition to humiliating their teachers, and rampaging throughout China disrupting transportation, communications, shipping, etc., the Red Guard managed to destroy or badly damage school buildings, facilities and supplies. They used schoolrooms and buildings as dormitories and Red Guard headquarters, burned textbooks, broke windows, damaged equipment almost beyond repair and pilfered everything movable.

With this situation as a background the Central Committee, in February 1967, ordered the re-opening of China's schools. Primary

(Cont.)

schools were to re-open throughout February, middle schools on 1 March and colleges by 20 March. It should have come as no surprise that as early as 28 February the Shanghai newspaper Wen Hui Pao reported Shanghai's schoolrooms as the scene of "merciless battering and ruthless struggle" and "tooth for tooth" anarchism among students. By 3 April Radio Canton was reporting that "tensions and antagonism seemed to be the rule of the day" in China's schoolrooms. The antagonism in some cases reportedly included manhandling of the teachers accompanied by the students' refusal to do classroom work.

By mid-May the Peking Daily was reporting that students were disregarding organizational discipline and some had been breaking up classrooms while shouting Mao's quotation: "rebellion is justified". On 30 May the Peking Daily admonished teachers frightened of interfering with the students' violence to "go bravely among the students to establish new revolutionary relationships between teachers and students." On 31 May Wen Hui Pao reported that "some units have met with resistance in re-opening classes to carry on revolution. This is because the bourgeois reactionary line has not yet been thoroughly liquidated." On the 27th and 28th of May Wen Hui Pao's correspondence columns indicated that many teachers in Shanghai were afraid to enter their classrooms or even be addressed as teachers. These columns also indicated that there had been a marked increase in damage to public property as well as thefts, quarrels and "public indecency" on the part of Shanghai adolescents -- all in the name of the revolution. According to the newspaper, the fever had caught on as well in primary schools, which were holding no regular classes.

In addition to its problems with lack of discipline, physical equipment and teachers, the regime faces another serious impediment to getting China's educational system back in order: the lack of an organizational framework on which to build.

a) Party committees in the universities and middle schools were among the earliest casualties of the Cultural Revolution.

b) National and provincial elements of the CCP apparatus dealing with education at all levels were virtually wiped out.

c) The Ministries of Education and Higher Education have lost dozens of officials experienced in school problems including both Minister of Education Ho Wei and Minister of Higher Education Chiang Nan-hsiang.

d) Colleges, universities, middle schools were purged of dozens of administrative personnel from top to bottom including three university presidents.

(Cont.)

e) The Central Committee of the CCP has been split into militant and conservative wings over the question of education reform.

With such a discouraging possibility of finding leadership or even assistance from experienced educators and organization men in bringing some order to the school system, the regime turned to the Army for help. In May 1967 the Liberation Army Daily announced Chairman Mao had instructed the army to "give military and political training to universities, secondary schools, and the higher forms of primary schools, stage by stage and group by group." The army was tagged the "pillar of proletarian dictatorship" and ordered to "instill the broad masses of revolutionary teachers and students with boundless love, belief, worship and loyalty to our great leader Mao." Peking Aviation Institute was hailed as the vanguard example of "resuming classes to make revolution," which became Mao's newest slogan to rally students and teachers. The re-opening of Peking Aviation Institute was heralded by the press in July 1967 (as have been a number of school openings since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution) as: "a temporary resumption of classes, to last from 3 July to 1 September with emphasis first placed on the great criticism and repudiation movement gradually phasing into a period of study as the primary objective." The subsequent release of the Institute's study schedule by NCNA furnished proof that academic study was to have a very small part in the students' lives:

"Reveille at 0600 hours, followed by half an hour of study of Chairman Mao's works and a half-hour of morning calisthenics.

"Two hours of the first period in the morning are for the study of Mao's works. The next two hours of the second period in the morning will be devoted to criticism and repudiation three days a week and to regular studies the other three days.

"The third period in the afternoon -- two hours -- will be devoted one day each to industrial, agricultural and military training, and three days will be left free for arrangement by the departments. /Presumably in some variation of industrial, etc. training./

"The fourth period in the evening -- two and a half hours -- will be devoted to the Great Cultural Revolution movement."

It is a commentary on this phase of experiments in education being conducted by Mao's regime that although the Aviation Institute's schedule begins at dawn and lasts until late evening, students devote only six hours of study each week to academic subjects. In releasing the schedule NCNA added that students will be doing a lot of marching on the drill field.

NCNA's next report sheds more light on the situation at the Peking Aviation Institute than the simple publication of "study" schedules: "July 1967. Many problems remain to be settled (at the Institute) because there is not enough time and preparations were inadequate. For example, how are the classes on study, on criticism and repudiation to be carried out? Where are those arranged for industrial and agricultural training to go? The students consider the schedule too tight and too rigid and declare 'we are testing this, and anything incorrect will be remedied.'"

Peking Aviation Institute is not alone in its problems. On 10 July NCNA in reporting on China's school system in general stated: "a certain feeling of fear prevails among the teachers; some of them are afraid of being caught by students for giving the wrong lectures, while others are afraid to handle student disciplinary problems."

China's news media have also offered an insight into another problem faced by the regime with regard to the school system: how to get large elements of the Red Guards who never did return to school, to cease their rampaging and go back to their classrooms. (Their rampaging is euphemistically referred to as "exchanging revolutionary experience.") On 18 August, the Shanghai newspaper Wen Hu Pao ran an article demanding that the trend of exchanging experiences be checked immediately, stating "if we (continue to) go to places to exchange revolutionary experiences ... we not only render no help to others in the course of the Great Cultural Revolution, but also cause splits and disorder, thus hampering the progress of the struggle ... We hope that students now exchanging revolutionary experiences in other localities make haste to return to Shanghai." On 23 August, People's Daily pointed out that the situation in China has changed markedly from a year ago, adding: "under the present situation it is wrong to be engaged in the extensive exchange of experiences again ... some students ... are reluctant to stay in their schools and always want to break out. This phenomenon must be corrected immediately."

On 29 August, the Shanghai radio stated that "according to recent findings, some teachers and students ... are still going to other areas on their own initiative to exchange revolutionary experiences. (Last year) this was entirely correct ... but the situation has changed and under present circumstances it would be wrong to carry out a massive exchange of experience." On 2 September, NCNA reported that the speakers at a Peking meeting the day before had stated that "Students ... who are now exchanging revolutionary experiences in other places should immediately return to their own places and their own units to make revolution."

It is difficult to predict how and when the regime will be able to resolve its present problems with China's educational system. Its attempts to cool down the Cultural Revolution do not appear to have been successful as yet; apparently the Army has not yet established a workable

form of discipline in the schoolrooms and there are no signs that the Central Committee has been able to reach agreement on educational reform. In fact, it appears that the situation in China today is essentially what it was on March 17th, 1967 when Foreign Minister Chen Yi admitted, via wall poster, that no decision had yet been made "on just how to change the education system."

The following figures were derived from: The Future of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia by Lea E. Williams (N.Y. Mcgraw Hill, 1966), Chung-Hua Min Kuo Nien Chien - 1960 (China Yearbook), U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1963, and where available statistical yearbooks of the countries concerned. The percentage of host country population, when more than 1%, is shown in parenthesis.

COUNTRY	OVERSEAS CHINESE	
Brazil	7,000	
Burma	400,000	(1.6%)
Chile	3,000	
Cambodia	435,000	(2.5%)
Canada	58,000	
India	8,000	
Indonesia	3,000,000	(2.5%)
Japan	50,000	
Laos	45,000	
Madagascar	9,000	
Malaysia	3,315,000	(35.1%)
Mauritius	22,000	
North Vietnam	190,000	
Pakistan	1,000	
Philippines	450,000-600,000	(1.0-1.8%)
Peru	30,000	
Republic of Korea	25,000	
Singapore	1,400,000	(74.5%)
South Africa	5,000	
South Vietnam	1,000,000	(6%)
Thailand	3,000,000	(9%)
United States	250,000	

THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY

TARGET OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

By C. T. HU, *professor of comparative education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and a leading Chinese scholar.*

UNTIL THE ADVENT of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution last summer, the term "higher education" in China referred to that phase of education which came after approximately twelve years of primary and secondary education. This phase had a duration of between four and six years, with a few fields lasting up to eight years. The major objective of higher education was proclaimed to be the training and supply of socialist workers, mastering the advanced knowledge and techniques necessary for national reconstruction. In order for the socialist workers with higher education to be both Red and expert, the fundamental approach has been the combination of education with productive labor. By 1958, after years of readjustment and reorganization, the institutions of higher learning fell into two general categories: about twenty comprehensive universities in centers of population concentration, in which most of the academic disciplines were represented – humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and some professional schools—and approximately 250 higher technical and teacher training institutes with one or more fields of specialization, such as agriculture, geology, petroleum industry, and the like.

Although not rigidly differentiated, the two types of institutions were entrusted with different educational tasks, the former for the training of theoreticians, advanced research personnel, and candidates for teaching positions in higher institutes, while the latter trained high-level technicians and practitioners. In terms of types of institutions established and number of students enrolled, both were subjected to rigid state control in accordance with the overall plans for national and especially economic development. In addition to the teaching institutions, there also existed in the early 1960s close to 900 research institutes devoted to the study of science and technology.

With the launching of the Great Leap Forward movement in 1958 there began a period of educational expansion on all levels at what appeared to be a breakneck speed. Almost overnight the number of schools on the higher education level was reported to have increased more than five times toward the end of that year. Like many similar claims of impressive progress in other aspects of the Leap, the gains in higher education later proved to be more fantasy than reality. By 1961, a full retreat was called along the entire policy line, and higher education underwent another phase of readjustment and reorganization. Imaginary statistics no longer appeared. But on the basis of available data, the number of higher institutions in mainland China today seems to be in the neighborhood of 300, enrolling slightly over 1,000,000 students, of whom the overwhelming majority are found in engineering, agricultural science, medicine, and other scientific and technical subjects.

Events on the mainland of China since the Communist accession to power have followed a pattern of alternation between radical and practical approaches. To use the Communists' slogan, it is an alternation between "Redness" on the one hand and "expertness" on the other. Although both are declared to be the ultimate goals of education, the achievement of ideological correctness and the acquisition of technical expertise cannot be complementary at all times. Consequently, there have been times when Redness is emphasized, inevitably at the expense of expertness, while at other times the reverse has been the case.

During the period immediately before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of mid-1966, the emphasis in education was clearly on expertness. This period, lasting from the latter part of 1961 to the middle part of 1966, was one of relatively stable development. This era had in turn been preceded by one which stressed Redness, the period of the Educational Revolution which began with the launching of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and placed highest priority on political activities and productive labor. The students were required to spend an enormous amount of time on political and labor activities, resulting in the neglect of their studies and the serious undermining of the teachers' role. The effect of such disturbances in the educational field became manifest in many ways, but most significantly it affected the training of scientific and technical personnel. This, coupled with withdrawal of Soviet experts and the ending of cooperative arrangements between China and the Soviet Union, created a number of technical difficulties for the proper management of economic and, especially, industrial enterprises.

By 1961, more than two years after the launching of the Great Leap Forward, the party hierarchy had begun to acknowledge the excesses and the disruption of education caused by this radical approach. Consequently, there began a switch from the earlier policy position, and the treatment of intellectuals underwent a series of modifications. The first sign of the policy shift came in June 1961 when Vice Premier Chen Yi stated in a speech to the graduating classes of universities in Peking that, whereas Redness is important for the preservation of ideological purity, expertness must also receive adequate attention so as to ensure that the nation has an adequate supply of technically competent individuals. He further expressed the hope that, in the future, participation in productive labor by both faculty and students in secondary and higher institutions of education would follow a more rational line, and that the physical well-being of the students would be properly looked after, in order to make certain that productive labor and participation in political activities would not affect their progress in academic pursuits.

If Chen Yi's speech marked a turning point in the direction of liberalizing educational policy, the specific and concrete measures were contained in a document known as *The Seventy Articles Concerning Education and Cultural Affairs*. Briefly, the articles called for the re-establishment of normal teaching processes, noninterference with academic work by party cadres, the shortening of periods for productive labor, encouragement of scientific experiment, proper respect for scholars, and the steady improvement in the quality of education.

Taken together, it is quite obvious that both Chen Yi's speech and the *Seventy Articles* represented a reversal of the earlier position of ideological rigidity. They were aimed primarily at correcting of some of the serious mistakes during the period of the Educational Revolution, and at creating a healthier environment in which scientific and technical personnel could be trained. The swinging of the pendulum in the direction of normalcy and rationality was accompanied by a general relaxation in the government's policy in the fields of art, literature, and cultural affairs. As a result of this policy shift, conditions in education and other fields improved markedly, and a feeling of "contentment and satisfaction" generally prevailed on all campuses. During this period of relative stability, conditions in general in China were also improving, as can be seen in the overall improvement in agriculture, the expansion of foreign trade, industrial growth, and in science and technology with a successful series of atomic explosions.

Toward the end of 1965, however, the ideologically more radical elements began to show their deep dissatisfaction with the state of affairs at that time. The campaign to purify ideology and to rectify rightist or revisionist tendencies was launched with the publication of an editorial in the Liberation Army newspaper under the title "Raise High the Great Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution."

In retrospect, these straws in the wind signaled the beginning of an approaching storm. Up to that point, the party functionaries in charge of educational affairs were still following the earlier and more rational policy of educational reconstruction. It seems clear that, while the period of moderation had brought considerable satisfaction to a large portion of the students in the major universities, at the same time the new policy disillusioned and antagonized a small number of what was later described as "proletarian revolutionary elements." On June 1, 1966, with the personal approval of Chairman Mao, the Central People's Broadcasting Station of Peking broadcast the entire text of a big-character poster put up on the campus of Peking University by seven "revolutionary" students.

This broadcast, coupled with the reorganization of the Municipal Party Committee of the city of Peking and the dismissal from positions of authority of Lu P'ing, president of Peking University, marked the beginning of the Great Cultural Revolution on the campuses of the universities and colleges and, later, at secondary schools throughout the country. As usually is the case in party purges and reforms, the Great Cultural Revolution in educational establishments began with a destructive or negative phase, during which the leading personalities were accused of a variety of crimes and acts detrimental to the Communist cause. Inasmuch as Peking University in many essential respects represented the highest educational institution, the kind of attacks made upon its leading officials typified the accusations later flung at the authorities in other institutions of higher learning.

The ascendancy of the revolutionary faction in Peking University gave rise to an entirely new situation in which the earlier policy of steady progress was subjected to the severest of criticisms and reexamination. Big-character posters went up in many parts of the university, all harping on the same central theme: that the principles of the Educational Revolution, which stressed the pre-eminence of politics and productive labor, had been violated by the campus party authorities. Lu P'ing and P'eng P'ei-yun, secretary and deputy-secretary respectively of the party committee at Peita (Peiching Tahsueh, or Peking University), were held responsible for "bourgeois revisionism."

THE major "crimes" of which they were accused included, first of all, discriminatory actions against students of worker and peasant backgrounds who, upon close examination, proved to be the very elements responsible for the Cultural Revolution within the university. The "rebels" claimed that the percentage of students from peasant-worker backgrounds had steadily gone down from 90 per cent in 1961 to 52.8 per cent in 1963. This was accomplished, according to the "rebels," by a variety of means. By raising academic standards for admission, the university authorities rejected increasingly large numbers of peasant-worker students; by subjecting those admitted to a series of rigorous examinations and unreasonably rigid requirements, the university managed to expel some on grounds of unsatisfactory performance and discouraged others from continuing their studies.

Such practices became known as "induced diarrhea" among the students. Of the more than 200 students transferred to Peita from agricultural, industrial, and military organizations for advanced education in 1959, the majority failed to complete their courses of study because of the academic demands made upon them, resulting in some students being kept back in their classes longer than the normal length of time and others dropping out. When the 1963 academic year began, less than 100 remained. The regulations required that any student failing one course in his major field and two in his minor field would not be allowed to advance to the higher class, while those who had failed during two consecutive years would be dismissed from the university altogether.

Rigid observance of this and other regulations resulted in higher academic standards, but usually at the expense of peasant-worker students, who, by and large, are not as well prepared academically as the "bourgeois" but culturally more advantaged students. As examples, the "revolutionary" students cited the fact that the Department of Mathematics and Dynamics kept back forty students in 1961, thirty-eight of whom were of peasant-worker origins. In 1962, the same department disqualified eight of the ten advanced research students who had been admitted the previous year on the strength of their party membership and party recommendation. More revealing, President Lu P'ing was quoted as having made the statement that "refined floral designs simply cannot be applied to coarse china." "Coarse china," in this case, referred obviously to students of proletarian background.

The second "crime" of which Lu P'ing and others were accused was said to be their deliberate violation of the principle of combining education with productive labor. Since 1961, in an all-out effort to correct some of the excesses and mistakes of the Educational Revolution, Peking University had introduced a series of measures under the slogan of "practical adjustment." It was decided that, on the average, the amount of time devoted to productive labor should not exceed one month in a year, and those who specialize in one or another of the many fields of science and technology, which last six years, should not spend more than twenty-six weeks in productive labor during the whole period. Under the new principle of uniting work with leisure, moreover, the type of labor performed by students also changed from physical labor in factories and on farms to moderate work on the campus, such as campus beautification projects or supplementary food projects.

Efforts were also made to assign students to the type of productive labor that would make the best use of their special knowledge and skills. To correct the generally low level of student health —resulting from serious food shortages and hard physical labor—the university paid special attention to the physical well-being of students, so that on those occasions when some students were required to work away from the campus, certain kinds of food not available in the countryside were often sent to the work sites. When a student suffered from some form of indisposition, the university would see to it that he was brought back to the university infirmary for either treatment or rest. These and other dem-

onstrations of concern for the well-being of students were now regarded by the "rebels" as clear indications of "bourgeois" or "revisionist" tendencies.

The "revisionists" were also charged with playing down the importance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung in the university curriculum. Because of inadequate academic preparation, most of the party activists assigned to Peita were, understandably, students in the humanities and the social sciences. To make up for their deficiencies in academic subjects, these students made repeated attempts to introduce Mao Tse-tung's works into the curriculum, not only to prove their Redness but also to ensure higher grades, since such courses required protestations of faith more than a mastery of the subject matter.

While the university permitted the organization of "study groups" for this purpose, after 1961 more emphasis was placed upon what were referred to as "basic theoretical courses," with the result that the study of the works of Mao was either abolished for students in certain specialties, or reduced to no more than ornaments for others. For example, during the five-year course in political economy, seventy-five class hours were devoted to the study of Mao's work, whereas seventy-two hours were devoted to contemporary "capitalist" economic theories. In the two specialties of Chinese literature and Chinese history, neither Mao's thought on art nor his philosophy of history was included in the curriculum. Some professors, moreover, openly objected to the inclusion of Mao's thought in their lectures.

In addition, Lu P'ing and others were also charged with blindly imitating the Soviet Union and secretly emulating the West, and with re-employing "scholars" and "authorities" whose political reliability, or Redness, had been so questionable as to deprive them of their positions.

BEING convinced of the correctness of their policy and unaware of the revolutionary ferocity to come, the leading personalities in Peita were confident that they could weather the storm and went so far as to declare, after the broadcast of the text of the wall poster, that "we will tear down the People's Broadcasting Station within three hours." With the removal of the so-called revisionists from the Peking Municipal Party Committee, however, the university authorities found themselves powerless to resist the onslaught of the "rebel" students, and both Lu P'ing and P'eng P'ei-yun were dismissed from their offices on June 3, 1966. On that day, a working team under Chang Ch'eng-hsien arrived in Peita to take charge of the Cultural Revolution.

Having swept across the Peita campus, the hurricane of the Great Cultural Revolution descended upon other major universities, notably Wuhan and Nanking, resulting in the dismissal of their presidents and other responsible officials who were considered bourgeois revisionists and guilty of opposing the principles of the Educational Revolution. Numerous charges were made, most of them similar to those leveled against Lu P'ing, but in the case of Li Ta, president of Wuhan University, his landlord background and personal affairs were brought under public criticism.

The Universities of Peking, Wuhan, and Nanking, because of their pre-eminence, have been singled out as the archetypes of the antiparty, anti-Mao, and antirevolution educational centers. Although less publicity has been given to lesser institutions, more than sixty top-ranking leaders in higher education —including the Minister of Higher Education — representing some thirty-five higher institutions were purged by the end of 1966. By now all colleges, higher institutes, and universities have been subjected to thorough cleansing and sterilizing in the wake of the Great Cultural Revolution.

On June 13, 1966, the Central Committee and the State Council jointly announced the suspension of entrance examinations for all institutions of higher learning, stating that, while certain changes had been made since the Liberation in the entrance examination system, the fundamental framework had been such that the system was opposed to the teachings of Chairman Mao and therefore was detrimental to the education of the revolutionary youth. In an editorial dated June 17, *The People's Daily* called for a thorough reform in education. In answer to this call, larger numbers of revolutionary students from many parts of the country and different institutions proceeded to condemn the educational system and its practices, and to recommend new changes. Without exception, all condemnations centered around ideological issues, the institutions of higher education being looked upon as centers of reaction—the nursery where future leaders of a capitalist society were being nurtured, where academic grades had superseded politics.

Ideologically inspired suggestions concerning reform poured in from all types of schools, including secondary schools, in various parts of the country. Some came in the form of big-character posters, others in letters to leading newspapers, still others in letters addressed to Mao himself. Having mobilized the masses, the cultural revolutionists in the party initiated a series of reforms, all aiming at the abandonment of the earlier principles and practices and the introduction of new measures in strict consonance with the spirit of the Great Cultural Revolution.

In spite of the generally chaotic conditions that have prevailed since the latter part of 1966 and the variegated forms in which educational reform decisions have been announced, it is now possible to piece together the many resolutions, decrees, and official statements, and to see the direction in which education is likely to go during the current phase of the Cultural Revolution.

First of all, in the crucial matter of distribution of educational opportunities, the class line is now stressed more strongly than before. In concrete terms, all entrance examinations have been abolished, and the new method is one of combining recommendation with selection. All eligible students must be screened by the competent party organs according to social background (which is impersonal) and political consciousness (which is personal). Preference is decidedly given to those of peasant, worker, and soldier backgrounds, which means, in view of the paucity of openings in higher institutions, the virtual denial of higher education to the nonproletarian classes.

Up to mid-1966, the regular school system followed the pre-Communist pattern of six-six-four, with certain university specialties lasting up to six or seven years. To the cultural revolutionists this is unduly long, not only because of the cost in economic terms but also because of the students' tendency to become politically and socially aloof. Consequently, the reform now calls for the drastic shortening of periods of schooling, aiming at the completion of primary and secondary education in eight years, and higher education in two to four years, with the majority of the students to be placed in two-year colleges. All students in higher secondary schools and colleges and universities will be required to take part in the three revolutionary movements of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation.

Pedagogically, two major principles have been advanced. One stresses the all-important source of revolutionary knowledge—the writings of Mao Tse-tung. The study of Mao's work is made compulsory for all students on all levels, but for students in higher education, the *Selected Works* has been made the basic course for all, irrespective of fields of specialization. The other principle seeks to bring about truly radical changes in the method of teaching. In order to do away with the feudal idea of according proper respect for scholars and authori-

ties who are apt to set themselves apart from the masses, the conduct of classes from now on is going to be guided by the new pedagogical principle of self-study and free discussion, requiring only nominal supervision by the faculty.

The central role of productive labor in education has been re-emphasized. There are clear indications that the great majority of institutions of higher learning (and secondary schools as well) are being transformed into half-work, half-study schools where students are expected to devote a considerable portion of their time to practical labor of all types, with special emphasis upon active participation in work on the farm and in factories. Physical exercise has been replaced by military training.

Like the People's Liberation Army, all universities and colleges have abolished the ranking system which used to divide the faculty into several ranks similar to Western and Soviet institutions. The five-point system of grading students' work has likewise been discontinued. Faculty members are discouraged, if not forbidden, from engaging in writing for publication, hence the interesting phenomenon of "publish and perish." All in all, the current educational scene is unquestionably one of relentless revolution which has firmly rejected almost all the earlier theories and practices of education. And while the rejection is complete and admits no compromise, there is as yet no indication of the feasibility of the revolutionary measures that have been thus far announced.

IT IS indeed too early to hazard a guess at this point about the long-term effects of these latest, revolutionary reforms on Chinese education. On the basis of what has been made known, however, some general observations are perhaps permissible.

Aside from the intense political struggle which has resulted in the downfall of some of the top leaders of the Communist regime, the true impact of The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution upon government administration, economic life, and social structure is far from clear, the slogans and oft-repeated policy statements notwithstanding. Only in education have there been concrete actions, both negative and positive, which seem to give rather clear indications as to what the revolution seeks to destroy and what it seeks to build. Perhaps this has been made necessary by the political necessity of mobilizing and utilizing the students who, even when rebelling as Red Guards, must be concerned about their educational future. By joining the Red Guards, they told China and the world what they did not want; but the party is at the same time obliged to tell them what they are going to get, under the banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. In this respect, it may be suggested that a thorough examination of the educational part of the current revolution probably can shed more light on both the intensity and scope of the larger revolution itself. The use of students on such a grand scale for intra-party struggle has no precedent, and its implication for the educative process and Chinese national life seems to deserve close scrutiny.

There can be little doubt that, just like the Cultural Revolution itself, the Educational Revolution has been engineered, directed, and coordinated by extremist elements who seem to have been driven to their position by both ideological considerations and personal grievances. Suffering from educational disadvantages, the peasant-worker-soldier students felt a threat to their careers and the need to revolt. One is led to believe that class consciousness, which sometimes manifests itself in jealousy and hatred for the more successful, is far from uniform as a mental state. For there are many of proletarian origin who have accepted the more moderate and practical policy of higher education since the early 1960s. The question arises, therefore: How universal is the feeling of dissatisfaction with the way higher education was run up to the summer of 1966? The admittedly inconclusive evidence seems to indicate that the student revolt is less spontaneous than it has been purported to be, and a good many of the students have taken part in the movement perhaps not so much because of conviction as for reasons of expediency or fear of reprisal.

Although the new reforms have not yet been implemented on a nationwide basis, if for no other reason than the suspension of higher education since last fall, the nature of the reforms has been made quite clear in the areas of recruitment of students, role of administration and teaching staff, length of schooling, and pedagogical principles. The demand made by some of the revolutionary students, apparently with the approval and blessing of those in charge of the Cultural Revolution, is to model all institutions of higher learning after the wartime anti-Japanese university, which had no formal curriculum, no academic standards, no regular faculty, or even a regular body of students.

Following Mao's teaching on the theory of contradiction, the Chinese Communists are fond of using dualisms in the sense of opposites. In education, there are such opposites as Red vs. expert, in terms of the meaning and purpose of education; bourgeois vs. proletariat, in terms of class composition; full-time vs. part-time, in terms of time distribution; indigenous vs. foreign, in terms of pedagogical application; and urban vs. rural, in terms of socio-economic orientation. [illegible] is the dual educational objective of intellectualizing the proletariat and proletarianizing the intellectuals.

The current Cultural Revolution cannot but be considered as a major and almost desperate attempt on the part of Mao and his supporters to bring about an ideological rejuvenation, and politics has taken command in the field of education. If, in Maoist terms, some of the opposites are basically nonantagonistic, the choice between Redness and expertness seems to continue to present exceedingly serious problems. Already there are signs of damage done to education, even when one chooses to discount the loss in human resources normally accruing through formal education. The present political and intellectual climate seems to discourage intellectuality in any form, while the words "scholar" and "authority" have become derogatory terms. One Chinese scientist, highly knowledgeable about scientific and technological publications on the mainland, has estimated that approximately 100 or so scientific and technical journals have suspended publication since last summer. And some Cultural Revolution publications have openly criticized the two leading biochemists who have been responsible for research leading to the synthesis of insulin, for their individualism and blind admiration of Western science.

The pendulum has swung all the way to the side of Redness, and how expertness can be achieved under such circumstances must remain an unanswerable question. What seems certain is this: As long as ideological purity is pursued with such single-mindedness within the Great Cultural Revolution, the pursuit of expertness through formal education in any form will suffer. By the same token, when there are signs of a return to normalcy in education, the end of the Great Cultural Revolution in its present form will probably be in sight.

ECONOMIC REVIEW
June 15, 1967

EDUCATION IN CHINA: This week marks the anniversary of the closure of China's schools and universities to allow the youth of China to pour out onto the streets to "make revolution". Many difficulties have arisen now that some schoolchildren have returned to their studies: a general lack of discipline, the absence of acceptable text books and the demoralised state of most of the teachers. The universities may not re-open for some time. Mr Munthe-Kaas attempts to estimate the extent of the set-back to China's educational system.

School Holidays

From Harald Munthe-Kaas, Peking

EXACTLY ONE YEAR AGO, China's schoolchildren and students went on "holiday". The schoolchildren are back (at least in theory) but there are still no signs that the students will be returning to their studies for at least another three or four months.

Originally, this suspension of teaching, announced on June 13 last year, was to apply to universities, colleges and senior secondary schools only and was to last for six months, to allow the authorities time to overhaul the educational system, to introduce a new school and university entrance regulations and to get rid of the "tenacious bourgeoi[illegible] domination" of higher education. However, within a short time, studies came to a complete standstill in all fields of education, including lower middle schools and primary schools, and the students surged out onto the streets to take part in the Cultural Revolution. Their activities as Red Guards, Revolutionary Rebels or Mao's Small Generals, have been widely reported. The "right to rebel" was interpreted by a large number of youngsters as a general licence to do what they wanted, resulting in many incidents which obviously went beyond what the authorities had intended.

As the Cultural Revolution passed through its various stages, it became clear that it would be impossible to keep to the original schedule, and the reopening of schools was postponed beyond January 13. In February, it was decided to try to reopen primary and secondary schools, and with a great fanfare the students returned — or at least were ordered to do so — by March 1.

Those who did return found their schools in a very different state from that nine months previously. The school buildings had been used as dormitories for Red Guards travelling all over China and needed repair and thorough cleaning. The equipment had either disappeared or was damaged. Most serious, of course, was the disappearance of a large number of teachers who either had been dismissed or treated in such a way that they did not dare to come back to face their former students.

Further, the "unity" of the students themselves had disappeared. In one of Shanghai's girls schools, for example, the students were divided into many factions, each claiming to be "following Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line", each accusing the others of being "conservatives" and "royalists", and the factions refused to be seated together with their "enemies". Finally, according to *People's Daily*, the girls were reunited by a realisation of the need to concentrate all their efforts on attacking the "top Party person in authority taking the Capitalist Road". The newspaper urged all schoolchildren in China to follow the example of these girls and stop "civil wars" among themselves. There is, however, little convincing evidence that any such unity has been achieved, either among primary and secondary school children, or in the universities. In the latter, according to wall posters, classes should have resumed on March 20, but they failed to do so.

In fact, there is almost no evidence of any regular teaching at any schools in China. Primary and secondary school students are going to classes in some places, but attendance is erratic and no comprehensive curriculum has been worked out. Some teachers have got together to try to work out some plan for their own schools, but they have either failed to agree among themselves on what to do (no one daring to take on the responsibility of making decisions) or their suggestions have been turned down by the students themselves. No new textbooks have been worked out to replace "bad" ones recalled at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and Mao's works and official newspapers seem to be the only teaching material in use at present. Many other teachers have simply refused to return to school without some guarantee of their personal safety and without some assurance that authority will rest with them and not the students. The introduction of PLA units into some schools to supervise activities and give some military training has not led to any noticeable improvement in discipline. In areas where it has been possible to observe developments, it appears that perhaps an average of one half or two thirds of the children at primary and secondary schools attend classes for one or two hours every morning, during which they read or sing quotations from Mao Tse-tung and undergo military training. That is all. For the rest of the day, the children are out on the streets, some of them taking part in revolutionary activities, but most of them playing or simply doing nothing.

Some of the difficulties the Chinese educational authorities are now facing were predictable — and were predicted by observers inside and outside China. After all, the youngsters were specifically told that there were "justified to rebel", and that is exactly what they have been doing. After a year of freedom to do almost exactly what they wanted — and to get away scot-free with most of their actions — they were never likely to submit quietly to efforts to re-establish discipline. The students, after having travelled widely all over the country, are now being asked to return to the routine of classes and instruction — by the very teachers against whom they have "struggled" and whom they have publicly humiliated. The teachers are officially expected to establish control over the same students who earlier denounced and maltreated them. It is hardly surprising that they are frightened and cautious.

Another reason for the difficulties the Chinese are now experiencing in education is the lack of machinery to implement any decisions that may be taken. The Ministries concerned with education have been badly mauled during the Cultural Revolution, and the people now in charge have to

build up an almost completely new apparatus all the way down to the local level, since educational authorities at the provincial and lower levels were among those who suffered most severely during the first phases of the Cultural Revolution. The situation in universities and schools is, of course, even more difficult, since a large majority of the Party, administrative and faculty committees have been virtually wiped out. At least in some places new organs have been set up to replace the old ones, based on alliances between revolutionary students and teachers, but they have so far not got around to tackling the problems of education as such, since they are still concentrating on politics only.

In fact, it appears clear that necessity (for disciplinary reasons) to call a halt to Red Guard travel and "exchange of revolutionary experiences" — earlier than had been anticipated back in January — interfered with the plan to reopen schools and universities "towards the end of the summer". Presumably the plan was to have a blueprint for a new educational system ready by the end of the summer, but the need in March to get the students back to the questionable discipline of school has complicated the situation. In February Peking posters did talk of a "Draft Directive on Education" being circulated, but in March subsequent posters made in clear that any final decision on teaching material and methods was still far off, and indeed the subject of high-level disagreement.

What new educational system will emerge is hard to say. Official pronouncements on the subject have so far mostly dealt with the deficiencies of the old system, which was able to turn "even people from the formerly most oppressed and exploited sections of the society" into "bourgeois revisionists". The new system, according to a Central Committee plan reported by Japanese correspondents, will base the selection of students on class criteria, giving preference to children of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary cadres, and revolutionary martyrs. Primary and secondary school will each last no more than four to five years and be based on a "half-work, half-study" system with at least one of the years spent in villages, factories and military units. Summer and winter vacations will be abolished, the students instead will participate in productive work. The study of Mao Tse-tung's thought is to be compulsory, and the students' revolutionary outlook is to be tested through participation in revolutionary activities. All examinations and tests are to be abolished, and teaching is to be conducted through the medium of free discussions. Whether a student will be allowed to go on to higher education will depend on his or her political outlook. Similarly the grading of teachers will be based on their political attitudes. High salaries and special privileges for professors will be discontinued. In short, schools are to be run on the lines of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College of Yenan days, thus ensuring that future generations will carry on the traditions of the Chinese revolution.

China's new educational programme will put politics in complete command of everything. Thus the present turmoil in the schools is regarded as a necessity if a solid ideological foundation for the development of new and truly socialist-minded successors to China's revolutionary cause is to be created. But it has all taken much longer than was anticipated a year ago, and even if China manages to get the students back before September, some time will have to pass before the necessary adjustments have been made to make it operate smoothly. Another formidable task still ahead is the writing, selection and printing of new teaching material to replace that in use up to one year ago, virtually all of which now seems to have been scrapped.

The experience China's youngsters have gained, in "making revolution" — in broadening their horizons by travelling and by challenging authority and by taking part in the intellectual ferment of the Cultural Revolution seems unlikely to be sufficient to counter-balance the complete gap in systematic studies. China's youth will probably have forfeited close to two years of formal education by the time the educational system starts to function smoothly again — and even this may be an optimistic estimate. The cumulative effect of this gap will be felt for many years to come as it produces its inevitable effects on the educational standards, of school leavers and on university levels and, later, on the quality of graduates. The political gains will have to be enormous to justify such a loss of national resources.

WASHINGTON POST
June 16, 1967

China's Schools Victim Of Maoists' Campaign

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, June 15—At Peking University and other schools in the Chinese capital students open their red-covered breviaries of Mao Tse-tung's quotations each morning, and chant slogans for an hour. Then they rush to political meetings or demonstrations at selected foreign embassies, or fight against rival factions.

That is the extent of education in many areas of China these days. And thus Mao Tse-tung's tumultuous Cultural Revolution, partly designed to remold Chinese youth, may ironically end up with the country's younger generation among its most serious casualties.

Closed "temporarily" a year ago to permit purges of their "tenacious bourgeois tendencies," China's schools and universities were theoretically reopened in late spring and early winter. In reality, studies are at a standstill—and are likely to remain paralyzed for the foreseeable future.

For one thing, classrooms and school buildings have been wrecked or disheveled by militant young Red Guards and other activists, who used them for meeting halls or dormitories, and also stole typewriters, mimeograph machines, radios and other equipment for their campaigns.

Buildings Damaged

An official Shanghai broadcast monitored here recently reported that primary and secondary school buildings in that city had been "severely damaged or were so filthy" that they could not be rapidly repaired.

More significantly, numbers of professors, teachers and students have been demoralized, either by political accusations against them or simply by what they considered the hopeless breakdown of China's educational system.

Increasing lawlessness by youngsters lately has added to the general disruption at Chinese educational institutions.

Lawlessness has, at the same time, taken the form of violent and often bloody battles between youth factions, each claiming to be Mao's most loyal followers.

Peking and Tsinghau Universities, for example, are both divided by rival factions.

Along with the growing anarchy, Chinese education has also been shattered by the sheer inability of the authorities to devise a curriculum that passes the test of Maoist purity.

Like most Chinese functionaries, education officials are paralyzed by the fear that the wrong kind of syllabus may mean their disgrace. Moreover, under Mao's doctrine of "extensive democracy," students can veto newly devised curricula, and are reported to be exercising their privilege happily as a way of avoiding their studies.

Since January, several educational reform schemes have been drafted, all of them advocating a reduction in the school terms, the substitution of vacations by summer work programs, an end to examinations and, most important, the subordination of all subjects to Mao's ideology.

The order of priority for school subjects was set forth in a recent People's Daily editorial which decreed that "lessons will consist mainly of the conscientious study of Chairman Mao's works . . . and, in primary schools, learning some arithmetic and general scientific knowledge."

Use of Mao's Works

One of the principal obstacles to putting some of these ideas into practice has been the obvious difficulty of contriving courses and publishing textbooks based on Mao's aphorisms, which are nothing more than self-evident banalities.

The head of the Cultural Revolution group, Chen Po-ta, revealed his attitude towards education not long ago at a conference of revolutionary students and teachers at Peking University. China's eductaion system, he said, needs "a big revolution."

Chen recommended that the curriculum be aimed at "stimulating students, encouraging them to be independent, to be their own masters." He added: "Sometimes the students should instruct their masters."

Turning to specific subjects, Chen suggested that literature courses might be cut out, since many of China's most prominent Communist writers never studied literature. He also favored the elimination of history courses or at least altering them to focus on "systematic criticism of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping"—China's Chief of State and the Communist Party General Secretary — who allegedly "double-crossed Chairman Mao since the war against Japan."

If the Cultural Revolution continues for another year, an informed Chinese reportedly told a visiting Ceylonese Communist leader last week, Chinese education will probably deteriorate further, undermining Mao's own long-term aspirations for a strong, modernized China.



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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 September 1967

Economic reprisals

Cuba rapped by OAS

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Has the hemisphere roared, or merely whimpered, in its latest declaration of economic reprisals against Cuba? The controversy here is loud and lasting.

Some skeptics, including sources in the Organization of American States, argue that the weekend OAS meeting produced little more than some unenforceable new recommendations and a warmed-over version of past pronouncements.

American Government officials, however, led by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, insist that the most heartening development at the meeting was the evident sincerity of hemisphere nations to give their recommendations real "teeth."

Subversion continues

Asked if the meeting was a mere "slap on the wrist" to Havana, officials reply, "more like a chop on the arm."

In themselves, even American officials admit, the 15 main resolutions do not make much difference to the Cuban threat. Twice before in the past five years the hemisphere has voted to censure Cuba and its Communist government — in 1962, when it expelled Cuba from the OAS, and in 1964, when the OAS called for all members to break diplomatic and economic ties with Havana. (All have done so except Mexico.)

Now they have done so again. Yet Premier Fidel Castro's infiltration and subversion continues, especially in Venezuela and Bolivia.

But, Mr. Linowitz maintains, there is a big difference. At the latest OAS meeting, foreign ministers showed a real desire to recommend only what they could implement.

For example: the meeting recommended that member states boycott all ships engaged in Cuba trade, by forbidding them fuel and denying them government-financed cargoes. According to Mr. Linowitz and other officials, the ministers meant what they said. The over-all vote was 20 in favor, none against, and one abstention (Mexico). The next few months will tell the story: American officials say they will show that OAS members will be strict about carrying out the resolution.

The United States already forbids entry to ships going to or from Cuba.

The skeptics wait to be convinced. What is to stop other countries using one ship (or more) for Cuban trade, and others for trade with the United States and other countries?

Again, another recommendation was that non-OAS members "restrict their trade and financial operations with Cuba, and sea and air transportation to that country. . . ."

Implementation seen

Mr. Linowitz says the hemisphere will make a serious effort to implement this. Presumably, he means that Latin-American capitals will say to the rest of the world: If you continue trading with Cuba, you don't trade with us.

But, the skeptics ask, will they in fact go so far? And how will other nations react?

Britain needs the foreign exchange it earns by selling buses to Cuba. In 1966, Spain, Canada, Japan, France, and the United Arab Republic were all major buyers and sellers in Havana.

Many observers here wonder if nations like Brazil and Colombia, which sell coffee and other raw materials to Canada, Japan, and Western Europe, will really "get tough," when such toughness could backfire and deprive them of trade instead of depriving Cuba.

Mr. Linowitz says he "hopes" other countries will agree to the recommendation. To a British reporter, who asked if this was not a bad time to ask Britain to forgo foreign trade (in light of its economic woes), he said he didn't think so.

Allies' best interest?

The United States, he said, would tell London that it was not in the allies' best interest for Britain to continue its Cuba trade. It is to be hoped, he said, that Britain would be more "receptive."

Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico would probably not join in the hemisphere effort, however, sources said.

Uneasiness about losing nonhemisphere trade was a powerful reason for OAS members' not adopting an American suggestion to draw up a public "blacklist" of companies trading with Cuba.

Mr. Linowitz made an additional point. The Soviet Union, he said, "may well give deep thought" to the OAS action in suggesting limited trade with Cuba.

The Soviet Union wants to expand its

trade with the rest of Latin America. Now it has been told it can't do that and continue to trade with Cuba as well. Besides, Mr. Linowitz says, Moscow disagrees with Premier Castro's militancy in exporting revolution by force. And it frets, he indicates, at the $1 million a day it spends to shore up the Cuban economy.

Again, skeptics find it hard to believe that the Soviet Union is about to lessen its hold on its spearhead into the hemisphere.

The OAS meeting carefully phrased its resolutions in the form of "recommendations." They are not mandatory. But American officials emphasize the final 20-0 vote as a sign of new anti-Castro solidarity. Castroism, they say, is not a major threat to governments—but should not be minimized, either.

Terrorism depicted

Many ministers were impressed with slides, shown by Bolivia, depicting terrorist activity—said to be led by Ernesto (Che) Guevara, onetime Castro aide.

To satisfy Venezuela (which called the OAS meeting in the first place to ask for condemnation of Cuba's infiltration of terrorists), the ministers referred the issue to the United Nations—though few expect any concrete action there.

To satisfy several nations, the United States agreed to reaffirmations of the social and economic goals of the Alliance for Progress in the final resolution.

Underneath all the talk and headlines, one fact is clear: The hemisphere is still split between the "hard liners" on Premier Castro—the United States, Venezuela, Bolivia—and the "soft liners"—Mexico, Chile, Ecuador.

American officials are nonetheless pleased, they say, at the impact of a new meeting, a new set of resolutions, and new impetus against Castroism.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 May 1967

Ships to Cuba

By the Associated Press

Miami

Ships from only nine non-Communist nations continue to visit Cuban ports, an exile organization said in its annual report.

Revolutionary Unity, which has kept records on such shipping since 1963, said five of them — Great Britain, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Italy — accounted for 90.9 percent of the 1966 shipping. The other countries were listed as Finland, France, Malta, and Monaco.

"Netherlands, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, and Haiti have withdrawn from the maritime fifth column," the anti-Castro organization reported.

British ships, numbering 98, led the list of 209 visiting Cuba in 1966, the report said. The over-all total was reported having dwindled from 358 in 1963, 341 in 1964, and 260 in 1965.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1967

23% of Cuba's Trade Is Still With Non-Reds

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 — Cuban trade statistics, recently made public by the House Foreign Relations subcommittee on Latin America, indicate that nearly one-quarter — 23 per cent — of Cuba's trade is still with non-Communist countries.

In 1966, Spain's trade with Cuba was valued at $116.8-million, Canada's at $62.4-million — including $48.5-million worth of wheat bought by the Soviet Union for Cuba—and Britain's at $35.7-million. Next came Japan with trade totaling $29-million, France with $25-million and the United Arab Republic with $23.2-million.

By contrast, Soviet aid to Cuba—mainly through above-world prices for sugar and through long-term credits — totaled $365-million, or $1-million daily. In addition, aid from other Soviet-bloc states totaled $300,000 daily. For the entire year Communist-bloc financing of Premier Fidel Castro's regime amounted to $475-million, subcommittee sources said.

In 1966 Cuba had $950,-

NEW YORK TIMES
27 September 1967

MADRID TO CONTINUE TRADE WITH HAVANA

Special to The New York Times

MADRID, Sept. 26—Spain was not expected to cut off her trade with Cuba despite the resolution by the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States urging friendly nations to halt aid to Havanna.

There was no official Spanish reaction to the recommendation today, but it was made clear here that Spain intended to maintain her commercial exchanges with Cuba, which include sales of trucks and industrial equipment.

The most recent statistics showed, however, that the volume of Cuban-Spanish trade was considerambly lower this year, chiefly because 15 ships built for Cuba in Spain were delivered last year.

Spanish exports to Cuba in 1966, including the ships, amounted to $78.6-million. The exports in the first eight months of 1967 stood at $18.6-million, according to provisional figures.

Imports from Cuba last year, mainly sugar and tobacco, were $38.1-million. In the first eight months of 1967 they were $15.9-million.

WASHINGTON STAR
17 January 1967

Failure to Budge Britain On Cuba Disturbs U.S.

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Latin America Writer of The Star

There is unhappiness in Washington over its failure to dissuade Britain from guaranteeing the sale of a $28 million fertilizer plant to Communist Cuba.

U.S. officials won't disclose the magnitude of their protests to London, but there is reason to believe the deal has become the subject of discussions on the highest levels.

The U.S. government has asked Britain to deny the five-year credit terms that would make the fertilizer plant sale possible by the Simon-Carves firm.

Without the backing of the British Export Guarantee Department, Simon-Carves almost certainly would not take the risk of building a $28 million plant for a country that has only $40 million in hard currency reserves.

Some officials say the United States has not given up the fight.

Publicity in England

The negotiations have received intense publicity in England, largely due to that nation's austerity program at home. Britain very badly needs the cash.

To the United States, the deal is of more importance for the psychological effect it would have on other U.S. allies who continue to trade with Cuba. If the British deal goes through, other western nations may be tempted to follow suit.

Cuba's credit with non-Communist countries is non-existent. Cuba is kept going by $1 million-a-day infusions from the Soviet Union in material, technical and military aid and all Havana has to offer is sugar.

Cuban exports to the non-Communist world have dropped from $250 million in 1964 to $100 million last year, largely because of the credit problem.

With sugar at a rock-bottom 1.25 cents a pound and most of Cuba's anticipated crop this year consigned to the U.S.S.R., it is estimated Cuba will have less than 1.5 million tons to sell on the free world market. And her sales to Communist bloc nations do not produce convertible currency.

Major Importance

In this perspective, London's decision on backing the fertilizer deal becomes of major importance to the Cubans who need credit, to the British who need cash and to the United States which is committed to isolating the Castro regime.

WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1967

Why They Deal With Cuba

Here's why Britain, France and other nations will keep on trading with bankrupt Cuba, despite OAS plea that they stop:

They believe Russia will underwrite Fidel Castro's debts because it's determined to keep a working communist outpost in this hemisphere, even if the Kremlin dislikes Castro personally.

Moscow has found no Cuban to replace Castro; recognizes that he is in control in Cuba; counts on its million - dollar - a - day subsidy to keep him in line.

France sold Cuba $35 million worth of bulldozers and trucks this year. Britain sold a $45 million fertilizer plant; Spain, $50 million worth of ships; Italy, $10 million in fertilizer. Canada helped Cuba's beef and poultry industries by supplying breeding stock and baby chicks. Washington insiders say Castro still can draw on deals totaling $100 million offered him by West European countries. And Russia has guaranteed Castro six cents a pound for his sugar — tho the world price is less than two cents.

Crack in wall

Economic blockade of Cuba pierced by British contract

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington's efforts to maintain the economic blockade of Cuba have again been frustrated.

The latest breach in the blockade wall came Friday with the signing of a $44.8 million contract for construction of a large British fertilizer plant at Cienfuegos, a port on the south coast of central Cuba.

Although Washington made efforts in January to stop the deal, it has been a foregone conclusion for weeks that the contract would be signed and that London would give credit backing to Simon Carves, Ltd., the British firm building the plant.

Moreover, the contract value stands at $5.6 million more than originally estimated.

Construction of the fertilizer plant will begin immediately. Work on clearing the site at Cienfuegos even began before the signing of the contract, and if all goes according to schedule the facility will be in operation by mid-1970. When completed it is expected to produce 550 tons of urea, a soluble fertilizer compound, and 850 tons of ammonia nitrate on a daily basis.

For Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, the contract represents something of a political coup. Coming at the moment when hemisphere nations are about to debate Venezuela's charges that Cuba is carrying out aggression, the contract signing has the effect of a slap in the face at both Venezuela and the rest of the American nations which join Washington in the economic blockade.

Membership suspended

Cuba has been suspended from membership in the hemisphere regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS), for a period of four years—and Mexico alone of OAS member nations now maintains diplomatic and trade relations with the island nation.

Signing of the contract will certainly cause some diplomatic unhappiness for Great Britain. It could play a role in the negotiations now being carried on by Venezuela over its claim to portions of Guyana which until last May was a British possession known as British Guiana. Similarly, it could influence the talks currently under way between Guatemala and Britain over British Honduras, a British possession on the Central American mainland which is moving toward 1968 independence as Guatemala presses its claims to the territory.

For Washington, the contract signing is a bitter, even if not unexpected, disappointment. The United States Government sees such transactions as a serious weakening of the economic blockade it tries to impose against Cuba.

Added to the fact that the contract was signed is the Wilson government's agreement to guarantee 80 percent of the value of the plant for five years after the scheduled completion in 1970. Actually, despite the blockade and other economic problems, Cuba has been proving a good trade risk. It has paid its trade bills on time to various Western firms supplying the island with industrial plants, vehicular transport and parts, and other items.

The Simon Carves fertilizer-plant contract is the second time that a British trade deal has breached the blockade wall. Three years ago, Leyland Motor Corporation signed a contract with Havana to supply what has amounted to $20 million worth of British-made buses.

Similarly, French and Spanish firms have carried out a number of trade pacts with the Castro government.

While the blockade has had its effect on Cuba—an effect which Premier Castro has readily admitted—it has not been as broad as Washington would like or as effective as Washington often claims.

The Leyland deal in 1964 and now the Simon Carves deal of 1967 illustrate this point.

Moreover, both these trade arrangements have brought and will continue to bring a sizable contingent of British engineers and specialists to Cuba. Simon Carves, for example, estimates that the construction will require 50 resident Britons to be on the scene through the next three years.

The signing ceremony for the fertilizer plant took place in Havana Friday—attended by Anthony J. Payne, senior manager of Simon Carves, and Andrés Montes, managing director of the Cuban Government agency, Cuba Industrial, which will participate in the construction of the plant.

The ceremony climaxed several months of talks in Havana and London to iron out technical, commercial, and credit details. It was during this period that the contract value was upped by the $5.6 million.

Premier Castro, who considers the fertilizer plant essential for Cuba's agricultural and economic development, took a personal interest in the negotiations, and in February offered a lunch for the British technical and negotiating team in Havana's Palacio Revolucionario.

In a speech last January, Premier Castro took note of the island's economic problems and called on non-Communist European nations to lend him a hand in his efforts to build Cuba and to support revolution in Latin America.

U.S. GIVES GREECE WARNING ON CUBA

Athens Told Aid Will Cease Unless Trade Is Halted

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Oct. 12 — The United States has served notice that all military and economic aid to Greece may be cut off this year if her ships continue to trade with Cuba.

The warning, conveyed by the American Embassy, followed approval of the foreign-aid bill, which incorporates restrictions for countries that fail to take steps to keep their ships from trading with Cuba and North Vietnam.

At the request of the United States, Greece has already banned all such trading by decree. But at least one shipowner has continued to trade with Cuba in defiance of the prohibition.

The ban, which went into effect in September, 1963, excluded ships that were on time-charter contracts at the time.

Achilles Franghistas, the recalcitrant shipowner, said today that he still had a time-charter contract from 1963 to deliver 12 more shiploads of goods to Cuba. Fourteen of his ships have visited Cuban ports in the last two months.

Ships Built in Soviet

Mr. Franghistas, who gave a $105-million shipbuilding order to the Soviet Union last December, is leaving for Moscow later this month to negotiate a second shipbuilding contract involving 35 more merchant vessels, mostly 36,000-ton bulk carriers.

The Greek Government has taken legal action against Mr. Franghistas for defying the ban. He is liable to imprisonment of up to six months and a fine. The master's certificate of one of his captains has been removed for defying the ban.

Among Mr. Franghistas' ships that have been trading with Cuba is the 9,500-ton Eftyhia, the first vessel delivered to him by the Soviet Union. She sailed for Cuba a few hours after the official delivery ceremony at Piraeus last Jan. 6. She was in Havana again on Sept. 21.

Mr. Franghistas said today that he believed the decree banning trade with Cuba was unconstitutional and that, if he were prosecuted further, he would challenge its validity before the Greek Supreme Court.

Officials indicated that the action against Mr. Franghistas would take years to come to court because of slow-moving judicial procedures.

It was this delay that prompted the United States Embassy in Athens to direct the Government's attention to the risks.

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NEW YORK TIMES
'22 October 1967

A Bargain With The Devil

By PATRICIA BLAKE

"YOU could cover the whole world with asphalt," remarked the late Ilya Ehrenburg, "but sooner or later green grass would break through." In this fashion, the process of suppression of modern Russian literature, that began in the late 1920's and persists to this day, has yielded from time to time to these stubborn shoots. A few works, like some of Zamyatin, Pasternak and Tertz, have only made their appearance abroad, while others have broken past the controls that have been greatly eroded in the post-Stalin era.

There still exist, however, obstacles to the task of restoring to Russian culture the work of the countless writers silenced or executed in the 1930's. Commissions charged with recovering the literary legacy of "posthumously rehabilitated" writers often find the police archives impenetrable, as in the case of Isaac Babel, whose unpublished manuscripts were seized at the time of his arrest in 1939. Yet, because of the devotion, persistence and courage of some Russian scholars and editors, a whole body of literature is, however slowly and fitfully, rising from oblivion.

The effect is hallucinating, like a first glimpse of Pompeii when the lava and the latter-day residents are cleared away: the lovers are revealed, enlaced, as the disaster found them, and works of art and graffiti alike are seen, still fresh upon the wall. Recently, these digs have uncovered a masterpiece: a novel by Mikhail Bulgakov that was unknown until its publication in the Soviet magazine Moskva in 1966-67. Had "The Master and Margarita" appeared when it was completed in 1938 it would surely have long been considered a classic of 20th-century fiction.

Now, after three decades of oblivion, two editions of "The Master and Margarita" have been published in America. But how unfortunate that of these two, only one has been translated (by Michael Glenny for Harper & Row) from the text as it was written by Bulgakov, which was obtained from unofficial sources in Russia. The other translation (by Mirra Ginsburg for Grove Press) was made from the expurgated text published in Russia last year. This is all the more distressing because both translations are excellent.

A comparison of the two versions of the novel offers a fascinating opportunity to look over the shoulder of the Soviet censor as he operates in Kosygin's Russia. The 23,000-word cuts made in the Moskva version used by Grove Press are worthy of a study by themselves, as they reveal interesting areas of sensitivity. The sense of the novel has been lost by the omission of Christ's "last words" on the cross. Two long, brilliantly comic passages have been excised, reducing the chapters in which they appear to a few paragraphs. One of these describes a nightmarish investigation of currency speculators. The other is an episode in which the devil's helpers create chaos in a store where foreign goods are being sold for foreign money to some fishy Soviet characters.

The major categories of cuts have to do with sex, speculation, shortages of goods and the Stalinist terror. Evidently it is inconceivable in Soviet Russia of the 1930's, or today, that anyone makes love, is naked, or even has an unbuttoned fly. References to arrests, police searches, fear, spies, "denunciations for harboring illegal literature," and other such features of the period have been expunged. In short the whole atmosphere of repression has been shaded out by the censor.

Ironically, we must be grateful to the Soviet Union for not adhering to the international copyright conventions. Otherwise rights would scarcely be granted by the Soviet authorities to publish any version but the expurgated one. And 29 years was too long to wait for this novel; readers should not be satisfied with anything but the full text.

Bulgakov began writing the novel in 1929, the year Stalin assumed complete political control of the Soviet Union, and finished it nearly a decade later, at the height of the great purges that swept millions into prison and decimated the intelligentsia. During these years, when Russia was possessed by an irrational and unconquerable evil, Bulgakov turned to the great allegories of the past, as other writers have done to preserve sanity at times of historical catastrophe. His themes are Christ's Passion, and the Faust legend transposed to Moscow of the 1930's and adapted, with superb ingenuity, to the circumstances of the period.

Here Faust is seen as a Russian novelist of genius ("the master") who is packed off to a lunatic asylum for having retold the Passion, according to apocrypha of his own devising. (Excerpts of his work are given to form a novel within a novel.) He makes his bargain with the devil—not for youth, or love or knowledge—but for freedom. And he breaks it—not for his immortal soul but for the redemption of Pontius Pilate in purgatory. The devil meanwhile has turned all of Moscow into a lunatic asylum: disembodied heads fly; clothing vanishes off ladies in the street; bank notes are transformed into champagne labels; and all the employees in an office, lead by a diabolic choirmaster, are unable to stop singing "The Song of the Volga Boatmen" in chorus.

Obviously such a book may be understood as a satire of Stalin's Russia, just as "Crime and Punishment" may also be read as a detective story. Yet the satanic humor of "The Master and Margarita" is made to serve philosophical intentions, allusively expressed and provocative in the extreme, that will henceforth surely be a subject for variant interpretations. Perhaps the most problematical notion is the moral ambiguity of the devil's works that is first conveyed by Bulgakov's epigraph from Goethe's "Faust":

"Who art thou then?"

"Part of that power which eternally wills evil and eternally works good."

Certainly there is excruciating pleasure, even edification, in the spectacle of dreary bureaucrats, grasping housewives and obtuse policemen being stripped down to their essential meanness by the devil. Even more suggestive, however, is the nature of the master's bargain with the devil. Although he exacts freedom from the devil, his spirit is broken by the world. Too weary now to fight for salvation for himself, he obtains it for Pontius Pilate, and settles at the last for the devil's offer of

limbo in a cozy cottage he can share with his love, Margarita, in eternity.

In spite of this ironic ending, Bulgakov's novel clearly asserts that the creative will of the artist will prevail; the artist must confront and deal with the devil who may ultimately yield to forces stronger than he. Indeed, the whole thrust of the book is in one of the extraordinarily moving passages that describe the Crucifixion. Here Christ's last words are reported to be "One of the greatest human sins is cowardice." These are the words that torture and pursue Pilate into purgatory. And this is the notion that made Bulgakov so threatening to the basis of totalitarian authority in the 1930's. How dangerous it remains today may be judged by the fact that all references to these crucial "last words" were censored out of the text of "The Master and Margarita" as published last winter in Russia.

Here one must refer directly to the conditions under which this novel was written, and to the stand of Russian writers in the face of the intensifying terror. During the period of Stalin's ascendancy, the majority of writers, deluded earlier about the nature of the revolution, were caught unaware by the fearful demands made upon them in the 1930's. Under attack for a variety of "errors," most submitted with scarcely a murmur, and were rewarded by being arrested during the great purges.

A few like Bulgakov, Zamyatin and Pasternak, refused to make any rationalizations of, or compromises with, the demoniac forces that possessed the nation — and it was they who survived. The fact that Bulgakov had the strength and the internal integrity to write "The Master and Margarita" under these conditions itself demonstrates the truth of his portrait of the artist as a redeeming figure.

BULGAKOV, who was by profession a doctor, and the son of a professor of theology, was well educated in scientific and theological matters. His first collection of short stories, published in Russia under the title "Diavoliada" ("Devilt y") in 1925, suggests an early fascination with diabolism of a contemporary sort. In the most famous of these stories, "The Fatal Eggs," a shipment of reptile eggs, sent in error by a Government bureau to a Soviet state farm, hatch into giant anacondas and crocodiles. These multiply incessantly, threatening the whole country with appalling devastation. Many thousands die and whole armies are routed until an early frost destroys the monsters. Another story from this collection, "The Adventures of Chichikov," has the scheming hero of "Dead Souls" return to Soviet Russia and find the same filth everywhere, and the same rascals up to their old tricks.

It was scarcely likely that such a writer would be accepted with much enthusiasm by the authorities after 1929, when literature began to be rigorously "bolshevized." Bulgakov's tremendously successful play, "The Days of the Turbins" (1926), based on his novel "The White Guards," was withdrawn from the repertory of the Moscow Art Theater in 1929. Three other Bulgakov plays were banned in quick succession. The 1930 edition of the Soviet Literary Encyclopedia called him an unregenerate bourgeois writer, and Stalin himself criticized his play "Flight."

In 1932 Bulgakov decided to try to follow the example of Zamyatin who had asked Stalin for, and received permission to emigrate. He wrote to Stalin telling him that he was being hounded by the police, that his apartment was frequently searched, and that he would commit suicide if he were not permitted to go abroad. Stalin phoned him, denying him permission to leave but saying that henceforth he would be left in peace and could go on with his work. Stalin then expressed the desire to see "The Days of the Turbins." This created a frightful commotion at the Art Theater which had to produce the play again on four-day's notice, simply to provide a private performance for Stalin. The play then went back into the repertory.

Several other plays by Bulgakov were later produced, but never again any on contemporary themes. One of these was a biographical play, "Molière," and a dramatization of "Dead Souls," which is still in the Art Theater repertory. But most of his writings were banned. Out of some 35 plays he wrote, only 11 are known to exist today, and of these six were actually produced in his lifetime. His encounters with censorship, and with terror-stricken directors of Soviet theaters, are described in his "Theatrical Novel," which was published for the first time in Russia in 1966, and which will appear next spring in America. This is a superb satire of the Art Theater in which the figures of Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko—old, demoralized and quarrelsome — are only faintly disguised.

DURING the late 1930's Bulgakov never lost his sense of proportion. Although his work ceased to be performed or published during the great purges, Bulgakov continued to write and to entertain his friends with comic parodies of imagined encounters with Stalin. The novelist Konstantin Paustovsky tells in his memoirs about one of these fantasies. "Why do you look so ragged?" asks Stalin. Bulgakov replies that he can't get work and that the theaters will not put on his plays. Stalin orders the party leaders standing nearby to take off their coats and hats and give them to Bulgakov. He then phones the Art Theater director to tell him to produce Bulgakov's plays. "This is Stalin," he says, "hello, hello . . . ." There is a long pause, and then he is apparently disconnected. He calls back and reaches the deputy director. "What! The director is dead?" says Stalin, and turning to Bulgakov adds, "What do you think of that? I was just talking to the director and now they tell me he just dropped dead. How strange. . . ."

Bulgakov spent the last year of his life in total blindness, dictating a still unpublished novel, "The Notes of a Dead Man," to his wife. "One must continue working while one is still conscious," he told her. His death of uremia in 1940 at the age of 49 was not reported in the Soviet press.

EAST EUROPE
September 1967

Culture and Party in Czechoslovakia

LUDVIK VACULIK

Following are excerpts from a talk given at the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in Prague (June 27-29) by a young author and novelist, a winner of the 1966 Writers' Union Award. The text of the talk was not published in Czechoslovakia, but subsequently became available in the West.

THIS CONGRESS was not convened after the members of the organization decided to meet . . . but only after the ruling circles . . . graciously gave their consent. In exchange they expect, as rulers have customarily expected for hundreds of years, to be treated with reverence. I suggest that we not show them reverence. . . . Let us play this game as if we were citizens, as if we had permission to use this playground. And for three whole days, let us act as if we were adult and had come of age. . . .

Here I speak as a citizen of a country which I will never renounce, but in which I cannot live contentedly. . . . I am a communist party member, and I would not, and moreover do not, wish to discuss party affairs [here]. But it so happens that in our country there is almost nothing left that at a certain stage of debate does not become a party matter.

What am I to do, when both my party and my government have done everything to weld their affairs together? Personally I believe that this is to the disadvantage of both. Also, it makes the position of the citizens assembled here difficult. Party members are bound not to discuss crucial aspects of the majority of important questions in front of non-members—and the latter have no access to the meetings where [such questions can be discussed]—so that both party and non-party members are equally limited in their basic freedom as citizens to talk with each other as equals. . . .

The regime's confidence was won by the obedient, by those who made no difficulties, by those who asked no questions that the regime itself did not raise. At every stage of the selection, the average man came out on top. And the complicated characters disappeared from the stage—those with personal charm, and particularly those who, because of their qualities and accomplishments . . . were a measure of the public conscience. So it was a negative selection. What happened to the others? Where are they? What do they think? What are they doing?

You have perhaps noticed that all of us, Czechs and Slovaks, are inclined to feel that in our various jobs we are led by men less capable than ourselves. And all of us, wherever we meet, complain bitterly. This is disgusting. Because the incapable and the lazy, the absolute good-for-nothings and the people with limited intelligence complain together with those who perhaps have reason to do so. The former also say that they cannot and must not. . . . Thus, a false and harmful unity has grown up between men who by no means belong together. We are all united by the most miserable impulse imaginable: . . . a common unwillingness. . . . In literature, depression, nihilism and spiritual decay are the fashion. The snobs indulge in orgies. Even the intelligent are becoming stupid. From time to time a clever man feels the need to assert himself—he wants to lash out left and right. But when he looks up and sees what is above him and then looks down and sees that there are people ready to stamp on him, he must ask himself: "My God, for whom am I doing this? . . ."

AFFLUENCE WITHOUT FREEDOM

But things are not too bad for Czechoslovak writers. They are better than for writers in other socialist countries. The writers have more money than other citizens, they have cars, they have villas in which they live and work—they are even allowed to travel, relatively unimpeded, to the West. It seems that all is quiet on the cultural front. But when I stand here and speak, I do not in the least have the feeling a free man should have when he speaks his mind freely. . . .

Just as I do not believe that the citizen and the regime can identify themselves with each other, so I do not believe that art and the regime can like being on good terms with each other. . . . They cannot and never will be. They are different. They do not match.

What is possible . . . [is] that they should understand their positions and work out respectable rules for dealing with each other.

Writers are also human. What is more, the ruling classes are human. And the writers are people who work, both authors and poets. Can't people in the the West read the works of Czechoslovak writers? Aren't their plays performed in the West and aren't they famous? Isn't the government proud of this? We say that artists are pleased when the government praises them, for instance, for designing a beautiful and impressive pavilion for an international exhibition. It gives such praise gladly, because it is also political. And perhaps it is honest praise. But the artist should not . . . be pleased because the government is: Such a pavilion, which in a certain sense enjoys the right of cultural extra-territoriality, only shows what these same artists could do at home if they were allowed to, and if they had the same weight in their own country.

Therefore . . . are we not all serving a fraud when we build beautiful, impressive pavilions? When we know that our best work is not considered desirable? That everything we do is done only by the grace of God? And that our time is running out? And we do not even know when it will do so?

Everything our culture achieves, everything good which men have done or created in our country . . . has [come about] despite the fact that our ruling circles have behaved in this way for years on end. These achievements were literally bullied out of them. And indeed much more could be done. Something could really be done.

But the government and leadership are spurring us on. . . . Was it not during the writers' congress that Jiri Hendrych, chairman of the party Ideological Commission and Secretary of the Central Committee, proclaimed that the party is striving to develop culture as an active factor in the great struggle between capitalism and socialism, and as an organic part of the socialist revolution and of the party's policy? Is that not a goal? Is that not leadership? But what sort of leadership? I see only the brakes being applied. . . .

THE RECORD OF FAILURE

I see and hear that the [regime] retreats only when it sees and hears too strong a resistance. But no arguments convince it. Only failure. Repeated failure, which costs us all money and tries our nerves. I see the return of the bad old days as a long-standing aim and a permanent danger. For what was the meaning of the statement that we have a union, publishing house and newspapers? A threat that they will take them away from us if we don't behave? . . . But are they really the lords of everything? And what remains of us in the hands of others? Nothing? Then we need not exist. But they should say so. Then it would be perfectly clear that basically a handful of people decide on our existence or non-existence. What we should do, think and feel. About everything . . . concerning culture. That is the position of culture in our nation today. . . .

Just as I do not feel very secure in the cultural-political situation, which the regime can apparently bring to a state of conflict, so I have no feeling of security as a citizen outside this room, outside this playground. Nothing is being done to me, and nothing has been done—because such things don't happen any more. Should I be grateful? I don't want to be. I am afraid. . . . I see no firm guarantees whatever. It is true that I see better work in the courts, but the judges themselves do not see any firm guarantees. I see better work by the state prosecutor's office. But do the state prosecutors have guarantees and do they feel secure? If they liked, I would be glad to interview them for the newspapers, but do you think it would be published? I would not be afraid to discuss with the state prosecutors why unjustly-sentenced and rehabilitated people do not automatically regain their original rights. How is it that the national committees do not give them their apartments or houses back? But that would not be published. Why has no one properly apologized to these people? Why don't they have the advantages of those who have been politically persecuted? Why are we miserly about money for them? Why can't we live where we want to? Why can't a tailor go to Vienna for three years or a painter for 30 with the opportunity to return [as a free citizen], not a criminal?

I see no guarantees. What guarantees? I don't know. And I stop, because at this point I am in great doubt. Do the ruling circles themselves, the government and its individual members, have these guarantees of civil rights, without which it is impossible to create—to create even a policy? Before the congress, the Writers' Union weekly, *Literarni Noviny*, polled a group of prominent writers and poets, asking them what the aim of the Writers' Union should be. The first series of answers was published. The second was banned by the censor. What did the writers want?

The measure of the real cultural level a country has attained is the manner in which the organized actions of the state are carried out. Therefore, it is more a question of the cultural level of politics than of good cultural policy. Wherever the policy of the politicians is imbued with culture, the writers, artists, scientists and engineers need not weaken themselves by a tug of war for their working rights, professional rights, group rights and . . . union rights.

They do not need to stress the specifics of their work. They do not need to arouse the antagonism of other citizens, the workers, peasants and officials who have the same rights as they but have no way of filtering their thoughts through the sieve of censorship. Policies devoid of culture evoke struggles for freedom. And yet the regime is annoyed when we constantly talk about it. It does not understand that freedom exists only in places where one does not need to speak about it. The regime is annoyed because people talk about what they see. But instead of changing what people see, the regime wants to change their eyes. And in the meantime we are losing the only valuable ideal: the dream of a government identical with the citizen. The dream of a citizen who governs almost by himself. Is this dream realizable?

Next year Czechoslovakia will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first republic and the twentieth anniversary of the second republic. But also the thirtieth anniversary of the Munich Pact, which led to the destruction of Masaryk's first republic. This first republic was not socialist. It left a heritage that Czechoslovak historians have so far been silent about. We have had partial successes on the road toward the dream we have aimed at since the beginnings of history.

One aim was the rise of an independent Czechoslovakia, a gain made by progressive people and progressive politicians, which has not yet been officially recognized and which I propose should be recognized. Because as a result a state was formed which, despite its imperfections . . . , brought with it a high level of democracy. And it was a state in which the citizens had no aversion to the ideas of socialism, to the socialism which could be realized . . . only in the second stage of the state's development. After the war [the idea of a socially just state was exchanged for] a program of socialism. Particular conditions arose which resulted in the fact that [in the implementation of this program] there occurred certain deformations and events which are not solely explicable by the climate in this country and which stem neither from the character of the people nor from their history.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED?

When we talk about that period, when we seek for explanations as to why we lost so much morally and materially, as to why we are economically backward, the ruling circles say that it was necessary. I believe that from our point of view it was not necessary. Perhaps it was necessary for the spiritual development of the organs of the regime, of the organs which compelled all the supporters of socialism to experience this development with them.

It is necessary to understand that no human problem has been solved in our country for 20 years—starting with the elementary needs, such as housing, schools and prosperity, and ending with the more refined requirements which cannot be satisfied by the undemocratic systems of the world. For instance, the feeling of full value in society. The subordination of political decisions to ethical criteria. The belief in the value of even small-scale labor, the need for confidence among men, the development of the education of the entire people.

I fear we have not risen on the world's stage and that our republic has lost its good name.

I do not wish to say that we have lived in vain, that nothing of what has happened has any value. It has value. But the question is whether it is only the value of forewarning. But was it necessary for a country which knew precisely the dangers for its culture to be made into an instrument for this kind of lesson? I suggest that in the [writers' congress] resolution we should state what progressive Czechoslovak culture knew even in the thirties. . . .

We are not trying to restore the first republic. The writers are socialists and they believe that socialism can create a beautiful new world—but only socialism as they conceive it.

When I criticize the regime, I do not criticize socialism, because I am not convinced that what happened here was necessary, and because I do not identify the regime with socialism, in the way it tries to identify itself. The fate of one need not be the fate of the other. And if the people who exercise power came here and asked us: Can the dream be realized? . . . they would have to take this answer as the expression of our good will and . . . our supreme civic loyalty: "I don't know."

– LE MONDE — 10 octobre 1967

DANS LES PAYS DE L'EST

EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE

Le pouvoir veut empêcher les écrivains de jouer un rôle politique, mais il se heurte à la résistance passive de la plupart des intellectuels

De notre envoyé spécial
MICHEL TATU

Prague, 9 octobre. — Les remous causés par l'offensive du parti contre les intellectuels anticonformistes en Tchécoslovaquie sont loin d'être apaisés. Vendredi dernier, à la suite d'une réunion de l'Aktiv des écrivains communistes tenue en présence de M. Hendrych, secrétaire du parti, il avait été décidé de proposer pour le poste de président de l'Union des écrivains — vacant depuis plus de trois mois, — la candidature de M. Edouard Goldstücker, éminent spécialiste de Kafka, vieux communiste de l'avant-guerre, dont la droiture et l'autorité sont respectées dans tous les milieux. Bien qu'il se soit fermement rangé au côté des libéraux et qu'il ait chaleureusement plaidé, vendredi encore, en faveur d'une authentique démocratie socialiste, son amitié personnelle avec M. Hendrych et son sens de la tactique politique donnaient à M. Goldstücker de bonnes chances de voir sa candidature acceptée par les dirigeants du parti. Mais l'intéressé, pour des raisons personnelles et sans doute aussi politiques, a décliné cette offre. On reste donc dans l'impasse.

Entre temps, le public a pris connaissance du premier numéro des nouvelles *Literarni Noviny*, hâtivement confectionné sur le cadavre de son illustre prédécesseur. Tout y avait été changé, jusqu'au dessin des deux lettres L N qui ornaient la première page, l'artiste qui l'avait conçu ayant refusé de céder ses droits au nouveau périodique. Le seul message laissé par l'ancienne rédaction était une lettre de l'écrivain Antonin Liehm — l'un des trois exclus du parti — qui interdisait au nouveau journal de poursuivre la publication de l'essai de Sartre sur la question juive, dont il avait fait la traduction au générique du périodique, au lieu de la douzaine de personnalités connues qui composaient l'ancienne rédaction, on ne trouvait plus que la signature de Ian Zelenka, rédacteur en chef, « et de son collège rédactionnel ». Derrière cet euphémisme embarrassé il fallait lire que sur les cinq anciens rédacteurs de *Literarni Noviny* (l'ancienne équipe comptait en tout dix-sept personnes), auxquels M. Zelenka avait finalement proposé de rester, un seul avait accepté son offre. Des offres similaires, faites à plusieurs collaborateurs de *Kulturni Tvorba* et d'autres périodiques, avaient été également rejetées. Le recrutement se heurtait donc, comme prévu, à d'immenses difficultés.

Aux dernières nouvelles, la seule personnalité un tant soit peu connue signalée dans l'entourage de M. Zelenka était un colonel écrivain dépêché d'urgence à la nouvelle rédaction sur ordre du ministère de la défense... Le boycott est également sévère parmi les lecteurs, dont plusieurs ont demandé l'interruption de leur abonnement. Autre manifestation de cette « résistance passive » : l'Union des écrivains continuait, jusqu'à lundi matin, d'afficher *Literarni Noviny* à l'entrée de sa grande librairie de l' « avenue du Peuple », mais elle présentait le numéro 39, le dernier de l'ancienne formule, pas le numéro 40, celui de M. Zelenka...

Réduire les prérogatives des unions d'écrivains

Tout cela montre la solidarité qui règne dans la communauté intellectuelle, mais il en faudrait bien davantage pour détourner les dirigeants du parti des buts qu'ils se sont fixés, et qui sont fort clairs : il n'est pas question, du moins dans toute la mesure du possible, d'emprisonner les récalcitrants ou de recourir à la terreur policière, mais de leur enlever toute possibilité de jouer un rôle politique. On s'en prend donc à l'organisation qui leur en avait fourni, ces derniers temps surtout, le cadre et les moyens d'action : l'Union des écrivains. Les efforts vont porter à cet égard dans deux directions :

En premier lieu, réduire les ressources matérielles de l'Union : celle-ci dispose, par l'intermédiaire du Litfond, ou « Fonds littéraire », de revenus considérables qui lui permettent notamment de soutenir matériellement ses membres contre les fureurs du pouvoir. C'est le cas aujourd'hui, où les nombreux intellectuels mis au chômage par les récentes mesures auront la possibilité de subsister plusieurs semaines ou plusieurs mois grâce aux « congés créateurs » financés par le fonds.

Le pouvoir ne peut guère intervenir — encore qu'on lui prête l'intention d'obtenir la suspension des avantages du Litfond pour au moins les trois écrivains exclus du parti, — mais il peut essayer de réduire l'activité des maisons d'édition, journaux et périodiques qui alimentent ce fonds. Déjà la liquidation du très prospère *Literarni Noviny* a conduit à ce résultat, puisque l'Union ne dispose plus maintenant que d'un seul hebdomadaire, le périodique slovaque *Kulturni Zivot*. Dans l'édition, deux entreprises sont réorganisées de manière à faire concurrence au grand consortium l'Ecrivain tchécoslovaque, dépendant de l'Union : l'entreprise Svoboda, qui publiait très peu d'ouvrages de littérature contemporaine, voit constituer en son sein une section littéraire sous la direction de M. Jiri Hajek, rédacteur en chef de la revue *Plamen*. Il en sera de même à la maison d'édition Praca, confiée récemment à la responsabilité de M. Pludek. L'une comme l'autre, bien pourvues en papier et en moyens matériels, auront pour mission de drainer, par la promesse de forts tirages et

d'honoraires plantureux, le plus grand nombre possible d'écrivains jeunes et « sûrs », en dehors de l'influence de l'Union.

En second lieu, on morcellera l'Union des écrivains en sections provinciales plus ou moins indépendantes les unes des autres, ce qui ralentira ses activités nationales. Cette procédure permettra en même temps de renforcer le contrôle des organes locaux du parti sur les activités littéraires : il en sera ainsi du mensuel *Host do Domu*, édité à Brno. La seule incertitude concerne pour le moment l'Union des écrivains slovaques, que M. Hendrych a semblé vouloir abaisser, elle aussi, au rang de « branche » provinciale. Cette attitude est d'autant plus insolite que les écrivains slovaques, mécontents de n'avoir pas été associés, à leurs yeux, à la campagne de leurs collègues tchèques pour les libertés politiques, ont joué un rôle extrêmement modeste pendant et après le congrès des écrivains, ce qui leur a valu les ménagements des autorités. Quoi qu'il en soit, le compte rendu des déclarations de M. Hendrych est jugé « obscur » à Bratislava. « *Il s'agit peut-être d'une erreur typographique* », déclare-t-on avec optimisme à l'Union locale des écrivains...

Une solution « à la polonaise » ?

On semble donc s'orienter vers une solution « à la polonaise » du conflit : à l'instar de ce que M. Gomulka a partiellement réalisé à Varsovie, M. Novotny et ses adjoints espèrent voir le calme régner du côté de leurs écrivains en « atomisant » leur organisation, en réduisant leurs activités collectives et en muselant les organes qui leur servaient de plate-forme : il ne restera plus, après cela, qu'à agir à titre individuel contre les « entêtés ». Mais il y a encore beaucoup à faire, car en face des intellectuels « tacticiens » qui, en Slovaquie notamment, déplorent les « scandales » du congrès des écrivains en juin, beaucoup plus nombreux précisément sont les « entêtés » ; pour ces derniers le congrès a été beaucoup moins le motif que le prétexte de la répression : les attaques incessantes contre *Literarni Noviny*, remarquent-ils, l'aggravation constante d'une censure que la loi sur la presse, adoptée il y a un an, aurait dû pourtant adoucir, le langage menaçant des officiels, tout cela laissait prévoir que la « récréation » offerte aux écrivains à l'occasion du congrès serait la dernière. Il n'y a donc rien à regretter.

C'est ainsi, en tout cas, que se comportent les principales victimes de la campagne actuelle : non content d'avoir été ménagé par les autorités — qui se sont limitées à un blâme à son endroit, — l'écrivain Pavel Kohout a prononcé vendredi, en présence de M. Hendrych, un violent réquisitoire contre ce dernier et M. Novotny, qu'il a accusés d'avoir informé de manière tendancieuse le comité central. Il a exigé la réunion d'une nouvelle session du « Parlement du parti », avec sa participation et celle des trois exclus. Il est probable qu'il devra être exclu lui aussi du parti. De même l'on parle maintenant de l'éventualité d'une procédure pénale contre M. Vaculik, le plus résolu des opposants, à la suite d'une interview explosive à un journal américain.

On sait pourtant que la direction du parti s'est trouvée divisée au moment de passer à la répression : en face des « durs », que conduisait notamment M. Chudik, président du Conseil national slovaque, des hommes comme MM. Dolansky, le vétéran des membres du présidium : Cernik et Kohlder, responsables de l'économie, ont plaidé la modération à l'égard de *l'intelligentsia*. L'attitude des deux derniers, de M. Cernik notamment, qui passe maintenant pour un ardent partisan de la réforme économique après l'avoir accueillie avec méfiance, est caractéristique : les réformateurs ne souhaitent pas voir s'ouvrir un « second front » du côté des intellectuels (leurs alliés jusqu'ici) au moment où des mesures impopulaires s'imposent dans l'ordre social et économique. Entre ces deux tendances on prête à MM. Novotny et Hendrych une position centriste favorable au rétablissement de « l'ordre », bien entendu, mais soucieuse de contenir dans une certaine mesure la poussée anti-intellectuelle qui monte des profondeurs de l'appareil.

De toute manière, il faut bien dire que la répression était inévitable : le souvenir du cercle Petoefi en Hongrie, qui, encore aujourd'hui, hante la mémoire de tous les dirigeants communistes de par le monde et de Mao Tse-toung lui-même, a pu jouer un rôle à cet égard, mais de manière secondaire : à la différence de leurs collègues hongrois, en effet, les écrivains tchécoslovaques ne cherchaient nullement à « descendre dans la rue », et les masses, de l'aveu général, sont plus soucieuses de leur niveau de vie que des problèmes de l'intelligentsia.

La vraie raison est que les audaces de *Literarni Noviny*, l'intrusion des écrivains dans les affaires politiques de la nation, constituaient une anomalie dans une Europe orientale figée dans ses structures, traversée par le vent conservateur qui souffle de Moscou depuis deux ans. Personne ne cache à Prague l'intérêt manifesté par les diplomates soviétiques pour les débats récents des intellectuels : le nom du premier conseiller de l'ambassade d'U.R.S.S., M. Ivan Oudaltsov — qui se trouve comme par hasard avoir été sous-chef du service idéologique de M. Ilyitchev à Moscou, en 1963 et 1964, — est souvent cité. Nul n'ignore enfin que l'incident qui mit le feu aux poudres au premier jour du congrès des écrivains fut la décision prise à la quasi-unanimité de ses membres de lire la lettre de Soljenitsyne contre la censure soviétique. Les dirigeants tchèques, qui n'avaient pas hésité, il y a deux ans, à repousser les critiques de M. Ulbricht contre les activités de leurs intellectuels, ne pouvaient rejeter les protestations de Moscou.

Pour la Tchécoslovaquie, en tout cas, pays de longues traditions démocratiques et paradis des « intellectuels de gauche », le résultat est paradoxal : c'est à ceux-là mêmes qui ont tant contribué, par leur engagement politique, à installer le pouvoir actuel que le parti doit dire aujourd'hui : « *Ne vous occupez pas de politique* ». Le jeu est devenu trop dangereux, moins pour les hommes, qui ont changé, que pour le parti, qui, lui, n'a pas changé, et veut voir dans cette obstination la preuve de sa sagesse. Egalement illusoire est l'espoir de voir fleurir un nouveau conformisme là où ne soufflent plus les grandes idées, mais un conservatisme purement défensif. « *En somme*, disait récemment un écrivain de Prague, *il nous faut revenir à 1950, mais avec la foi en moins.* »

NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1967

Text of Solzhenitsyn's Demand for End of Soviet Censorship

Following is the text of an appeal by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Soviet writer, for the abolition of literary censorship in the Soviet Union, as translated by The New York Times from the original Russian made available by Le Monde of Paris:

Letter to the Fourth National Congress of Soviet Writers
(In Lieu of a Speech)

To the presidium and the delegates of the congress, to members of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the editors of literary newspapers and magazines:

I

The oppression, no longer tolerable, that our literature has been enduring from censorship for decades and that the Union of Writers cannot accept any further.

This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit [Soviet censorship agency], not provided for by the Constitution and therefore illegal and nowhere publicly labeled as such, is imposing a yoke on our literature and gives people who are unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers.

A survival of the Middle Ages, censorship manages in Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existence almost to the 21st century. Of fleeting significance, it attempts to appropriate unto itself the role of unfleeting time of separating the good books from the bad.

Our writers are not supposed to have the right, they are not endowed with the right, to express their anticipatory judgments about the moral life of man and society, or to explain in their own way the social problems or the historical experience that has been so deeply felt in our country.

Works that might have expressed the mature thinking of the people, that might have timely and salutary influence on the realm of the spirit or on the development of a social conscience are prohibited or distorted by censorship on the basis of considerations that are petty, egotistic and, from the national point of view, short-sighted.

Outstanding manuscripts by young authors, as yet entirely unknown, are nowadays rejected by editors solely on the ground that they "will not pass."

Many union members and even delegates at this congress know how they themselves bowed to the pressure of censorship and made concessions in the structure and concept of their books, changing chapters, pages, paragraphs, sentences, giving them innocuous titles, only to see them finally in print, even if it meant distorting them irremediably.

Notes Ban on Pasternak

We have one decisive factor here, the death of a troublesome writer, after which, sooner or later, he is returned to us, with an annotation "explaining his errors." For a long time, the name of Pasternak could not be pronounced out loud, but then he died, and his books appeared and his verse are even quoted at ceremonies.

Pushkin's words are really coming true: "They are capable of loving only the dead."

But tardy publication of books and "authorization" of names do not make up for either the social or the artistic losses suffered by our people from these monstrous delays, from the oppression of artistic conscience. (In fact there were writers in the 1920s, Pilnyak, Platonov and Mandelshtam, who called attention at a very early stage to the beginnings of the cult and the particular traits of Stalin's character; however, they were destroyed and silenced instead of being listened to.)

Literature cannot develop between the categories "permitted" and "not permitted" —"this you can and this you can't." Literature that is not the air of its contemporary society, that dares not pass on to society its pains and fears, that does not warn in time against threatening moral and social dangers, such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and it published works are used as waste paper instead of being read.

Sees Leading Role Lost

Our literature has lost the leading role it played at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and the brilliance of experimentation that distinguished it in the 1920s. To the entire world the literary life of our country now appears as something infinitely poorer, flatter and lower than it actually is, than it would appear if it were not restricted, hemmed in.

The losers are both our country, in world public opinion, and world literature itself. If the world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of the world would move along in a different way, acquiring a new stability and attaining even a new artistic threshold.

I propose that the congress adopt a resolution that would demand and insure the abolition of all censorship, overt or hidden, of all fictional writing and release publishing houses from the obligation of obtaining authorization for the publication of every printed page.

II

The duties of the union toward its members:

These duties are not clearly formulated in the statutes of the Union of Soviet Writers (under "Protection of copyright" and "Measures for the protection of other rights of writers"), and it is sad to find that for a third of a century the union has defended neither the "other" rights nor even the copyright of persecuted writers.

Many writers were subjected during their lifetime to abuse and slander in the press and from rostrums without being given the physical possibility of replying. Moreover they have been exposed to violence and personal persecution (Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Zoshchenko, Platonov, Aleksandr Grin, Vasily Grossman).

The Union of Writers not only did not make available its own publications for reply and justification, not only did not come out in defense of these writers, but through its leadership was always first among the persecutors.

Names that adorned our poetry of the 20th century found themselves on lists of those excluded from the union or not even admitted to the union in the first place.

The leadership of the union cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution and death (Pavel Vasilyev, Mandelshtam, Artem Vesely, Pilnyak, Babel, Tabidze, Zapolotsky and others).

600 Sent Off to Prisons

The list must be cut off at "and others." We learned after the 20th congress of the party [on de-Stalinization in 1956] that there were more than 600 writers whom the union had obediently handed over to their fate in prisons and camps.

However, the roll is even longer, and its curled-up end cannot be read and will never be read by our eyes. It contains the names of young prose writers and poets whom we may have known only accidentally through personal meetings, whose talents were crushed in camps before being able to blossom, whose writings never got further than the offices of the state security service in the days of Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria and Abakumov [heads of the secret police under Stalin].

There is no historical necessity for the newly elected leadership of the union to share with preceding leaderships responsibility for the past.

I propose that paragraph 22 of the union statutes clearly formulate all the guarantees for the defense of union members who are subjected to slander and unjust persecutions so that past illegalities will not be repeated.

III

If the congress will not remain indifferent to what I have said, I also ask that it consider the interdictions and persecutions to which I myself have been subjected.

1 My novel "In the First Circle" was taken away from me by the state security people, and this has prevented it from being submitted o publishers. Instead, in my lifetime, against my will and even without my knowledge, this novel has been "published" in an unnatural "closed" edition for reading by a selected unidentified circle. My novel has become available to literary officials, but is being concealed from most writers. I have been unable to insure open discussion of the novel within writers associations and to prevent misuse and plagiarism.

2. Together with the novel, my literary archives dating back 15 and 20 years, things that were not intended for publication, were taken away from me. Now tendentious

have also been covertly "published" and are being circulated within the same circles. The play "Feast of the Victors," which I wrote down from memory in camp, where I figured under four serial numbers (at a time when, condemned to die by starvation, we were forgotten by society and no one outside the camps came out against repressions), this play, now left far behind, is being ascribed to me as my very latest work.

3. For three years now an irresponsible campaign of slander is being conducted against me, who fought all through the war as a battery commander and received military decorations. It is being said that I served time as a criminal, or surrendered to the enemy (I was never a prisoner of war), that I "betrayed" my country, "served the Germans". That is the interpretation now being put on the 11 years I spent in camps and exile for having criticized Stalin. This slander is being spread in secret instructions and meetings by people holding official positions. I vainly tried to stop the slander by appealing to the board of the Writers Union of the R.S.F.R. [Russian Republic] and to the press. The board did not even react, and not a single paper printed my reply to the slanderers. On the contrary, slander against me from rostrums has intensified and become more vicious within the last year, making use of distorted material from my confiscated files, and I have no way of replying.

4. My story "The Cancer Ward," the first part of which was approved for publication by the prose department of the Moscow writers organization, cannot be published either by chapters, rejected by five magazines, or in its entirety, rejected by Novy Mir, Zvezda and Prostor [literary journals].

5. The play "The Reindeer and the Little Hut," accepted in 1962 by the Theater Sovremennik [in Moscow], has thus far not received permission to be performed.

6. The screen play, "The Tanks Know the Truth," the stage play "The Light That Is in You," short stories, "The Right Hand," the series "Small Bits," cannot find either a producer or a publisher.

7. My stories published in Novy Mir have never been reprinted in book form, having been rejected everywhere—by the Soviet Writer Publishers, the State Literature Publishing House, the Ogonyok Library. They thus remain inaccessible to the general reading public.

8. I have also been prevented from having any other contacts with readers, public readings of my works—in November, 1966, 9 out of 11 scheduled meetings were canceled at the last moment—or readings over the radio. Even the simple act of giving a manuscript away for "reading andd copying" has now become a criminal act, and the ancient Russian scribes were permitted to do.

My work has thus been finally smothered, gagged and slandered.

In view of such a gross infringement on my copyright and "other" rights, will the fourth congress defend me, yes or no? It seems to me that the choice is also not without importance for the literary future of several delegates.

I am, of course, confident that I will fulfill my duty as a writer under all circumstances, from the grave even more successfully and more unchallenged than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to the truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to accept even death. But, maybe, many lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime. At no time has this ennobled our history.

A. I. Solzhenitsyn.

May 16, 1967.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1967

Listing of Writers Censored by Soviet

Following are the names and identifications of Russian literary figures mentioned in Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's letter calling for the abolition of censorship:

AKHMATOVA, Anna (1888-1966), poet, known for the intimate, personal character of her verse; denounced in 1946 in Stalinist literary purge.

BABEL, Isaak (1894-1941), prose writer, arrested in 1930's, died in forced labor camp. Author of "Red Cavalry," depicting violence of Russian Civil War.

BULGAKOV, Mikhail (1891-1940), novelist and playwright whose satirical works were implicit criticisms of Soviet regime. One of his plays "The Crimson Island" (1926), was direct attack on Soviet censorship. Some of his works have been republished and produced within last year.

BUNIN, Ivan (1870-1953), prose writer, emigrated from Soviet Union in 1921, won Nobel Prize in 1933. Despite hostility to Soviet regime, a one-volume selection of his works was published in Moscow after his death, followed by five volumes of his collected works.

DOSTOYEVSKY, Fyodor (1821-81), novel. Spent four years in Siberian exile because of association in the 1840's with the Petrashevsky Circle, a discussion society of utopian socialists. Depicted his experiences in "Memoirs from the House of the Dead."

GRIN, Aleksandr (1880-1932), popular novel of fantastic tales, found by official Soviet critics to be out of line with Soviet era.

GROSSMAN, Vasily, (1905-1964), novelist whose war novel, "For the Just Cause" (1952), about battle of Stalingrad, was officially criticized in last years of Stalin era for not being sufficiently party-oriented.

GUMILEV, Nikolai (1886-1021), poet of Acmeist school, noted for clarity and concreteness of imagery. He was executed on charges of anti-Soviet plotting.

KLYUYEV, Nikolai (1887-1937), peasant poet whose early enthusiasm for Soviet system gave way to disillusionment. Arrested in 1933 and died in a prison camp.

MANDELSHTAM, Osip (1891-1942), poet, noted for coldly detached, sophisticated, sometimes obscure verse. Arrested in early 1930's, allowed to return to Moscow, banished again to Siberia, where he died.

MAYAKOVSKY, Vladimir (1893-1930), leading poet of early Soviet period. Suicide attributed by some to disillusionment with Soviet life.

PASTERNAK, Boris (1890-1960), lyric poet, translator, and author of novel, "Doctor Zhivago," which was smuggled abroad and won him Nobel Prize in 1958. Died in disgrace. After his death, his poetry was republished.

PILNYAK, Boris (1894-1937), novelist criticized in the late 1920's for unorthodox works and stylistic and typographical experimentation. Disappeared in the purges.

PLATONOV, Andrei (1896-51), short-story writer, member of group that opposed proletarian literature in 1920's. Stories home folklore backgrounds, heroes are concerned with religious and moral issues. Protested depersonalization of man by machine.

REMIZOV, Aleksei (1877-1957), prose writer, left Soviet Union in 1921 and died in Paris. Works have whimsical, grotesque or religious overtones.

TABIDZE, Titsian (1895-1937), Georgian poet, translated by Pasternak; disappeared in Stalinist purges.

TSVETAYEVA, Marina (1894-1941), poet known for spontaneous, passionate verse; left Soviet Union in 1921, returned in 1939 and committed suicide in 1941.

VESELY, Artem (1899-1939), prose writer, disciple of Pilnyak, disappeared in Stalinist purges. Has been quietly rehabilitated through the reissue of selected writings.

VASILYEV, Pavel (1910-37), poet, former seaman and Siberian gold miner, perished in Stalinist purges. Work reflected an artist's problems in overcoming old traditions and adjusting to new society.

VOLOSHIN, Maximilian (1878-1932), Symbolist poet who openly opposed the revolution but remained in Soviet Union, living in seclusion in Crimea as a "spiritual émigré."

YESENIN, Sergei (1895-1925), leading early poet of Soviet period, of peasant background, opposed emphasis on industrialization, known for a widely publicized, rowdy personal life. A suicide.

ZAMYATIN, Yevgeny (1884-1937), prose writer, hostile to Soviet regime; his stories warned of coercion and uniformity in a Communist society. Silenced after late 1920's, he was permitted to emigrate in 1932 and died in Paris.

ZABOLOTSKY, Nikolai (1903-58), poet arrested in Stalinist purges of late 1930's, survived eight years of imprisonment and was rehabilitated.

ZOSHCHENKO, Mikail (1895-1946), author of outspoken satirical short stories. Denounced with Anna Akhmatova in 1946 during crackdown on arts.

SUNDAY TIMES
10 September 1967

Freedom call to Novotny follows mass Czech appeal

By Nicholas Carroll, Antony Terry and Alex Mitchell

THE PUBLICATION by the Sunday Times last week of an appeal to the West by more than 450 Czechoslovak intellectuals for moral support in their fight against censorship has evoked widespread interest and comment throughout the world. The appeal was reprinted in full or part in many leading European and American newspapers and periodicals, was widely broadcast on radio networks, and discussed for half an hour on the BBC

The Sunday Times took every possible step to verify the authenticity of the document, described by its authors as a "Manifesto to the world public." The names of all the signatories were withheld, at the explicit request of the people who transmitted it from Prague, in order to minimise the risk of reprisals against individuals. Because of this precaution, some readers have asserted that the 1,000-word document was not genuine.

Without prejudicing the security of the unorthodox channels between Prague and the West, it can be stated that several copies of the document left Prague by different and well-established routes, one being the use of a special courier. By September 1 three of these copies had reached their destinations.

They were identical, thus excluding the possibility that the manifesto was re-written, edited or altered by emigré Czech writers after reaching the hands of [illegible] initial recipients, as some readers had suggested. A letter accompanying the manifesto gave the numerical breakdown of the signatories in different groups.

Meanwhile, Die Welt, published in Hamburg, made its own independent check on the authenticity of the manifesto and only decided to reprint it in full when completely satisfied on the important issue of the signatories.

By far the most remarkable reaction to the publication of the manifesto came last Tuesday from Guenther Grass, the West German novelist, who lives in Berlin. He is one of the 10 writers living in the West on whom the manifesto called for support. As soon as he read the appeal he wrote the following open letter to President Novotny:

Dear Mr President: I saw today in the Sunday Times a call for help by Czech artists and scientists. The urgent call in which I am mentioned by name and asked for help tells me clearly: here are my friends speaking.

What do the Czech artists demand? Freedom of opinion, freedom of thought, and the relaxation of censorship. These demands are old. As old as the published word. The demand for freedom has survived all dictators whose machinery of power persecuted and extinguished this free word in your as in my country, and placed it under house arrest.

The technique of survival is simple. I may reveal it to you: the Czech and German writers passed on the free word under Metternich, Hitler and Stalin. No power apparatus is imaginative enough to suppress it entirely, for the need of the human being for the free, disturbing, doubting, accusing, liberating word is greater than its demand for apparent security which the State and States always try to impose on their citizens at the cost of freedom.

You, Mr President, possess power at present. My power is limited to the word, which does not mean that your power is greater, as absolutely as you may command the means of effective power. Just as it is in your hand to curtail the arts, yes, even to persecute them, just as little the apparatus of power and rigid doctrines a match in the long run for the free word.

Every day our world must be named anew. It lives from contradictions. Who would be prepared today to preach for its immobility? What prevents you from seeking an ally, an uncomfortable ally, in the free word? The Czech artists have by their work given Czechoslovakia a world-wide reputation.

Not from party meetings which are uniform in their expression of opinion, and in which gloomy reprimands are distributed, do we take the message of your country, but from Czech poetry, the Czech film, the young Czech theatre, which touch and change us. And you want to abandon these riches?

If the Communist States petrify under the dictatorship of party bureaucracy, the Western democracies stagnate because attachment to special interests corrupts their parliaments. An opposition without a machinery and (as you probably imagine) without power is united over all rigid ideologies against this state of formalism in East and West.

This lack of power has caused me to hesitate to write to you earlier, as I hate the kind of easy protest which only mentions its own point of view. Only the direct appeal to me by name, coming from Czech friends and colleagues, allowed me, from a position of safety or pretended safety in the West, to pass on their protest.

About a year ago I received the news that my books were also to appear in Czechoslovakia. I was glad, for books know no frontiers. May I, dear Mr President, ask you to extend the removal of the censorship from my books to the books, plays, films and scientific works of my friends and colleagues, and to allow them to appear in an atmosphere of freedom?

In the interests of your party and your country I call on you: "Give them freedom of thought!" I write as a German author and Social Democrat. I greet you, not without assuming I will find reason, sympathy and tolerance.

GUENTHER GRASS

The manifesto made a specific appeal to "you leftish Western intellectuals who are still subject to dangerous illusions about democracy and freedom in the Socialist countries" and named 10 writers. These were all approached by the Sunday Times last week.

A personal quarrel between Alberto Moravia and John

Steinbeck was incidentally uncovered during the inquiries. Moravia, speaking from Venice, said he would not sign any protest which carried Steinbeck's name. "Steinbeck is for war in Vietnam, and I hate war," he added. He had not seen the full text, but would study it during the week-end.

Other comments were:

Steinbeck: It's a phoney, isn't it?

Arthur Miller (who is President of P. E. N. International): I'm trying to find out more about it. I don't want to shoot off about it when I haven't got enough information.

Jean-Paul Sartre: The issue is too difficult and dangerous to discuss on the telephone, but I have studied the document closely. I will give my views in Le Temps Moderne next month. I am aware of the problem.

Peter Weiss: I don't want to take any stand until I know the situation behind it—who signed it, who drew it up. It could be a serious document, or a provocation. It's difficult to answer an anonymous plea.

Bertrand Russell (through his secretary, Russel Steller): Until Lord Russell has read an official text he isn't saying anything. Naturally he's interested in the plight of writers all over the world.

John Osborne: I sympathise with the plea. It's an extraordinary naïve document. Their problem seems endemic to their society. I don't know what on earth I can do.

Mr. Michael Foot, M.P.: Not only do I think we should respond to this, but what they say to us is telling us what socialism means.

Arnold Wesker, the British playwright: Who wrote it? Who signed it? Just how much credence can you give to it? I want to make sure the people behind this are my friends. It could even be a government plot to discredit all the good work of some people.

Russell Braddon, the Australian author: Let's face it, my support or the support of all the writers in the West won't alter the situation. If anyone thinks what he says is going to improve the situation for the Czechs, then he's crazy.

The Czechoslovak Writers' Union last week formally disclaimed any connection with the manifesto, but the wording of their disclaimer was significant. The existence of the document was not denied; all that was denied was knowledge of its existence by the union.

The secretariat of the central committee of the union announced that the manifesto "was not published either by the union of Czechoslovak Writers or its elected bodies, and this organisation had no part in it in any form whatsoever. What is more, the union has no knowledge that the document was drawn up by Czechoslovak writers or any group of them independently."

On Friday, Rude Pravo, the main party daily newspaper, took official cognizance of the manifesto, as published by the Sunday Times. Once again, the existence of the document was not categorically denied; the paper commented that "it does not express the views of the majority of Czechoslovak writers, though it may express the views of a small group."

Some readers found the tone of the manifesto uncharacteristic of the present mood of Czech writers; yet Le Monde commented last week "Its elevated tone and content leave no doubt as to its authenticity."

Ten days ago President Novotny made an attack on Czechoslovak intellectuals during a Government reception. It now seems highly probable that a copy of the manifesto (possibly made available by an informer) had been shown to him beforehand, and this would explain the exceptional violence of his attack.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1967

PARTY IS ACCUSED BY CZECH WRITERS

300 Intellectuals Reported to Implore West to Rescue Their 'Spiritual Freedom'

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 3—More than 300 Czechoslovak intellectuals have accused the Communist party in their country of conducting "a witchhunt of a pronounced fascist character" against "the entire Czechoslovak writers' community."

The accusation was made, The Sunday Times of London reported today, by Czechoslovak writers, artists, scientists, publicists and other intellectuals in a "writers' manifesto."

The newspaper said it had obtained a copy of the document but was withholding the names of the signers "to reduce the risk of instant reprisals by the regime."

As published by The Sunday Times, the manifesto accused party representatives of having "expressly ordered the crossing-off at first of 12 and later of 4 of the names of the most courageous colleagues from the list of candidates" for the Writers Union's Governing Committee.

Police Surveillance Reported

The party representatives "threatened to silence" the candidates, the statement said. It contended that the candidates had been "put under police surveillance and prohibited from publishing their works" and were "being subjected to persecution that is endangering their livelihood and personal freedom."

The manifesto said the events occurred during and after the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers held in Prague June 27 to 29.

Czechoslovakia's acting chargé d'affaires in London, Jan Pátek, said: "I very much doubt whether this document is true. It has all the appearances of being fabricated."

The manifesto said that participants in the congress and other Czechoslovak intellectuals were "turning to the public and writers of the entire free and democratic world with an urgent appeal for help to rescue the spiritual freedom and fundamental rights of every independent artist threatened by the terror of state powers."

The Sunday Times said the document "was accompanied by an appeal for world publicity." It was signed by 183 writers, 69 artists, 21 film and television people, 56 scientists and publicists, and other intellectuals, the newspaper said.

Addressing themselves to writers elsewhere, the signers of the document declared:

"Protest! This is an emergency! Demand the right of free expression and criticism as well as the end of personal persecution.

"And please do so, especially you leftist Western intellectuals who are still subject to dangerous illusions about democracy and freedom in the socialist countries, who protest against American massacres in Vietnam, against fascism in Spain, militarism in Greece, against racism in the United States and tend to overlook what happens there where you are pinning your hopes!"

A Personal Appeal

The statement then appealed by name to Arthur Miller and John Steinbeck of the United States, Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Prévert of France, Bertrand Russell and John Osborne of Britain, Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll of West Germany, the German-born Peter Weiss, Alberto Moravia of Italy and the Soviet writers Ilya Ehrenburg (who died Thursday), Aleksander Solzenytsin, Yevgeny Yevtusenko and Alexander Voznesenski.

"Defend democracy! Defend freedom!" these writers were exhorted. "Do not permit the victory of terror over the independence of the soul."

The statement declared that its signers believed, with Ralph Waldo Emerson, "that only a nonconformist can call himself a human being," and with Sartre, "that a writer bears responsibility for developments in his time."

The manifesto said that the writers' congress in June had demanded "unlimited freedom of speech and opinion, of thought and creation, abrogated by nothing and no one, which we consider as obvious rights of every artist in a democratic and humanitarian society."

The congress, according to the statement, "pleaded for the abandonment of political censorship, appealed against anti-Semitism and racism in the official politics of our state in its relationship to Israel" and sought "democratization and humanization of public life and cultural politics in Czechoslovakia."

LONDON TIMES
19 September 1967

The intellectual ferment in Czechoslovakia

By Richard Davy

I spent most of last week in Prague talking to intellectuals and officials about the battles going on in their cultural life. I also asked them about the dramatic "manifesto" published in *The Sunday Times* on September 3. This was the document in which 329 representatives of Czechoslovak cultural life were said to be appealing to world opinion for help against a "witch-hunt of pronounced fascist character" that was being unleashed against them by their "terroristic regime".

The document seemed to link up with other recent events, such as the stormy writers' congress in June, the semi-secret trial and savage sentencing of the young writer Jan Benes, and the defection to Israel of another writer, Ladislav Mnacko.

I found the situation indeed very tense and difficult. There is clearly a struggle of enormous significance going on in Czechoslovakia at the moment. But, although my baggage was singled out for search at the airport when I left, I found no signs of "terror". I was able to meet and talk openly with writers who are in the deepest disgrace. I found officials reasonably frank about the problems. And I returned doubting whether the document was quite what it purported to be.

I did not expect anyone to tell me that he signed the document. I did believe that if it were wholly genuine it would have left some tracks and hints in its passage through so many hands in the intimate world of Czechoslovak cultural life. I thought it could also be tested by seeing how far its description of the situation was accurate.

On neither count did it quite live up to its claims. Writers in the front line of the battle, whose support would obviously have been canvassed for any serious organized protest, denied having even dimly heard of it before it appeared, and did not seem to feel that it truly represented their views. It is, for instance, surprising that anyone trying to gather broad support would invoke the names of President Benes, John Steinbeck, and President Kennedy. I am not sure, either, that the legitimate pride of Czech and Slovak intellectuals would let them appeal for help in quite those terms. They are fighting their own battles with a long tradition behind them, and while they welcome the interest of the outside world, they have few illusions about what could be achieved by active intervention.

STRICTER DISCIPLINE

I am not yet prepared to stake my reputation on saying the document is a forgery. There is still more evidence to be collected. But my provisional impression is that although it could have started in Prague it did not emanate from the people who really matter there, and it may exist in more than one version. The explanation offered by Pavel Kohout to our Bonn Correspondent (published on another page today) seems plausible, though it does not solve the mystery entirely.

For the moment what really matters is the situation in Czechoslovakia. This was exaggerated in the document but not wholly falsified. It is true that things are at a very critical stage, that many writers are demanding a complete end of censorship, that some are in difficulties, and that the regime is nervously trying to reassert control.

It seems likely that Czechoslovakia is now in for a period of stricter ideological discipline and tighter curbs on free expression. The fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution is part of the excuse for a reaffirmation of faith. The struggle to introduce the new economic system is threatening the party's cohesion and control, which makes it more than ever anxious to keep control in other spheres. Above all, the intellectuals themselves are in a state of extraordinary ferment.

But the struggle is not simply a confrontation between intellectuals and the party. It is taking place within the party itself, and among the intellectuals. There is an infinite variety of attitudes in both main camps.

While generalizations break down immediately one meets individuals it is broadly true that what the most active rebels are demanding — in many different ways and degrees—is not just freedom of artistic expression but a genuine reexamination of the whole meaning of socialism. This, I believe, is the real significance of what is going on in Czechoslovakia at the moment.

Many of the rebels, such as Ludvik Vaculík, Pavel Kohout, and A. J. Liehm, have been devoted supporters of the party for much of their lives. They belong to the generation that experienced Munich and the Nazi occupation and after the war they pinned their faith on communism. They went through the Stalinist period with varying degrees of enthusiasm, still believing that the party knew best.

Now, judging by their speeches at the writers' congress, they are going through something like a crisis of belief. They still have their old visions but they are losing their faith in the ability of the present system and the present party to realize these visions. They no longer know what their faith really means, and they are beginning to wonder if the party knows either, or has any real vision left beyond the desire to maintain its own power.

PLEA FOR DEBATE

Apart from these people there are younger ones who have been imbued at school with all the ideals of socialism and who now find that reality does not live up to their expectations. And then there are those who have never believed in the system.

Few have blueprints for an alternative. All they seem to agree on is the need for the sort of genuine renewal and examination that can come only from really free and open discussion. They feel that the party's attempts to dictate opinion and suppress open discussion are no longer appropriate (if they ever were) to a sophisticated country facing complex problems never dreamed of by Marx and Lenin. They want open debate. They are worried about the use of power without sufficient controls. They are beginning to doubt the ability of the party to renew itself from within, to encourage excellence, and to adapt itself to the present day. They are passionately concerned with simple things like justice and truth and human dignity.

They want freer contacts with the rest of the world. And as they feel the clamps coming down again after a few years of considerable freedom they

remember how they were duped by Stalin, and feel a moral obligation to prevent a reversion to anything similar. Above all, they feel there should now be more to show for 19 years of socialism and they want to know what has gone wrong.

All these doubts and frustrations boiled over the writers' congress in June and they are still simmering. The vehemence and bravery of many of the speeches was extraordinary. The strongest were not published in Czechoslovakia, though it is still possible they may be. Vaculík's leaked out to the west. But even readers in Czechoslovakia could get a pretty good idea of what was being said when some of the speeches were quoted for refutation.

Thus readers of *Rudé Právo*, the party newspaper, learnt that Vaculík said: "Over 20 years no solution has been found in this country for any of the human problems, starting with primary needs, such as housing, schools, and economic prosperity, and ranging up to the more subtle needs which the non-democratic systems of the world are incapable of solving." They could learn that Milan Kundera described that past 30 years of literary creation as a period of mere propaganda.

They could also read the extraordinarily powerful resolution passed by the Congress, with remarks such as "The essential feature of socialist culture does not lie in the delineation of a certain canonized set of ready truths, but rather in a search for the greater freedom of man" or "Present Czechoslovak culture once again tackles the classical question of its history: whether the pride of victory will go to the great experience of democracy and creative dialogue between different aesthetic tendencies or to the idea of manipulated and fictitious unity" or "Tolerance . . . provides room in which values confront each other and crystallize".

The party's reaction to all this has not fully emerged. Mr. Hendrych, leader of the party delegation to the congress, dismayed his audience with a lecture in old-fashioned dogmatism. President Novotny has given a stern speech about the need for party control over culture. There are to be courses all over the country in "cultural policy". Vaclav Havel, the young playwright, has been denied a passport. There are rumours that some rebels will be expelled from the party, and that *Literární Noviny*, the magazine on which many of them work, may be closed. But so far most of them are living and working as freely as can be expected under such a cloud of disapproval and uncertainty. They know they are in for a difficult period but they mostly believe it will blow over in due course. They are not entirely without support in the party apparatus, which is not as monolithic as it seems.

Meanwhile, the main roots of the problem remain. The system has reached a stage where it no longer relies on police terror, but has yet to find an effective alternative. It has done some rethinking in the economic field and hopes that material incentives and some aspects of a market economy will do the trick. But it has rejected the political reforms that were supposed to accompany the new economic system. Many people believe it cannot afford to do this. In short, the party must eventually decide between returning to a system of terror (which would be extremely difficult, and in my view unlikely), or slowly moving on to some form of democracy, which will be scarcely any easier.

NO POLITICAL LIFE

The intellectuals are trying to take advantage of this indecision to give a powerful push towards the second alternative. Hardly surprisingly the party apparatus, with its interest in maintaining control, resists. It no longer propagates the old doctrine that all culture should propagate the party ideology. Indeed, it has allowed a lot of freedom, especially to film makers, who have had a wonderful flowering, free of both ideological and commercial pressures.

But this phase now seems to be ending. The film makers are dismayed by new commercial pressures. The writers, apart from their political feelings, are impatient with the lengthy uncertainties of getting published and oppressed by the feeling that ultimate control still lies in the hands of people who do not understand them.

So far as doctrine is concerned they seem to feel that, instead of being told to engage in politics, they are being told to keep out. This is clearly an impossible demand in a system where any view of life has political implications. It is also impossible in a central European country with a long tradition of literary engagement and an absence of any real political life for nearly 20 years.

Somehow and somewhere, in the present stage of Czechoslovak development, there has to be a debate of real fundamentals. If it does not take place in parliament or in the party apparatus it will continue to bubble away in the writers' union. In the long run the party may well discover that it needs the debate, and needs the writers who now conduct it.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1967

Soviet Poet Denounces Writers' Union

By M. S. HANDLER
Special to The New York Times

Andrei A. Voznesensky, the Soviet poet, has denounced the Soviet Union of Writers for the "lies, lies, lies, bad manners and lies" that it employed in preventing him from appearing at the Lincoln Center Summer Festival on June 21.

In a letter that Pravda, the official party newspaper, refused to publish, Mr. Voznesensky also denounced what he called the degrading treatment of writers in the Soviet Union.

"Clearly," he wrote, "the leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knocking peoples' heads together is standard practice."

The poet sent his letter to Pravda on June 22, the day after he was to have appeared at Lincoln Center. Copies were widely circulated among Soviet writers in Moscow. A text recently came into the possession of The New York Times from European sources, as did the text of a poem Mr. Voznesensky read on July 2 at the Taganka Theater in Moscow. The poem violently denounced literary bureaucrats.

Two days after his appearance at the Taganka Theater, Mr. Voznesensky, according to the same European sources, was summoned to a special meeting of the board of the Union of Writers. The poet was asked by 14 union officials to retract the statements he had made in his letter to Pravda.

Mr. Voznesensky refused and instead made a defiant speech in which he repeated the attacks he had made in his letter.

The board voted to censure Mr. Voznesensky and threatened him with expulsion from the union if he did not reconsider.

The expulsion, if carried out, could mean that Soviet publishing houses would refuse to publish his poems. His right to conduct public poetry readings might also be jeopardized.

The poet's current troubles, according to informed sources, are traceable to the open friendship that he showed to American society and American writers during his tour of the United States last May. He returned to Moscow on May 22 to increasing attacks.

Passport Sent to Consulate

A week before Mr. Voznesensky was to leave for New York in June, he informed Lincoln Center officials that he would keep his June 16 commitment. Several days before he was to depart, however, he cabled, "I can't come." In the meantime, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent the poet's passport to the United States Consulate in Moscow, requesting a visa, but it was too late for Mr. Voznesensky to keep his engagement.

Mr. Voznesensky addressed his June 22 letter to Mikhail V. Zimyanin, editor of Pravda. In his opening paragraph he said:

"For nearly a week now I have been living in an atmosphere of blackmail, confusion and provocation."

He then related how on June 16 he received official notification from the Union of Writers that his trip to New York was "inadvisable." He outlined the actions by which he said the trip was prevented —how the world was told one thing and he another.

"What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruples," he wrote.

For three days, he added, the union told foreign newsmen that he was sick. "But why haven't they at least informed me that I am sick?" he asked. "It's difficult to imagine anything more idiotic. It's an insult to elementary human dignity.

"I am a Soviet writer, a human being made of flesh and blood, not a puppet to be pulled on a string," he said.

Concluding his letter, Mr. Voznesensky wrote:

"It is not a question of me personally, but of the fate of Soviet literature, its honor and prestige in the outside world. How much longer will we go on dragging ourselves through the mud? How much longer will the Union of Writers go on using methods like these?

"I am ashamed to be a member of the same union as these people."

Mr. Voznesensky apparently was compelled to cancel poetry engagements in July in London and in Sofia, Bulgaria.

WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1967

Soviet Writer Ill-Treated In Prison, His Wife Says

By Edward Crankshaw
London Observer

LONDON, Aug. 13 — News has reached the West that the jailed Soviet writer Yuli Daniel may be undergoing severe physical ill-treatment in a Russian labor colony.

The information comes in the form of a remarkable letter addressed by Daniel's wife to the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and government and to many official organs. It is clear that, although the scale of the Soviet police terror has been curtailed, its spirit remains as it was under Stalin.

Nearly two years have passed since the arrest of Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky, 18 months since they were sentenced to seven and five years' imprisonment respectively in a strict labor camp for libeling the Soviet Union. The trial smelled of Stalin's Russia and evoked an unprecedented wave of protest, not the least from distinguished foreign Communitsts.

Held in Prison

In her letter, Mrs. Daniel appealed for a stop to "the inhuman and illegal actions" of those in charge of the corrective labor camp at Potma in Mordynea. "I beg them to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which endanger the health and life of my husband and of other detainees, and which discredit our government and our legal system," she wrote.

"Daniel is at present detained in the prison of the camp, where he is to stay for six months. These are the facts which have led to his being treated so severely:

"The warders forbade Daniel to use an anti-mosquito ointment and ordered him to give up his supply of it . . . Daniel refused to obey the order. Thereupon three warders fell upon him and started twisting his arms. Daniel naturally resisted. They overpowered him, threw him on the ground, battered is face, handcuffed him and locked him up in the prison hut of the camp in which the detainees are subject to so-called rigorous discipline.

In Poor Health

"This means that they may not lie on their bunk from reveille to lights-out, that the hut is cold and damp, even in summer, and that their food is limited to a punitive ration. Daniel is in poor health . . .

"Not that the punishment inflicted on Daniel is in any way exceptional in the camp where political prisoners are kept. Any arbitrary decision of the camp commandant has the power of law . . .

"In 1967, the 50th anniversary of the Soviet regime, prisoners are subjected, to what the Soviet code of the 'twenties qualified as torture. All this, as I see it, should provoke serious thought and lead to insistence on socialist legality being upheld in places of detention."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 October 1967

SOVIET MAY TRY LITERARY FIGURE

He Sent Out the Transcript of Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial

By PETER GROSE

One of the key figures in the Soviet literary unrest following the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial last year ies believed to face himself in Moscow on charges of anti-Soviet activities.

He is Aleksandr Ginzburg, 25 years old, the Soviet source through whom the West lerned of the protests by prominent Soviet intellectuals against the convictions of the two writers, Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yul M. Daniel, in February, 1966.

They were sentenced to hard-labor camps for smuggling to the West manuscripts of fiction that the Soviet Supreme Court judged to be anti-Soviet.

The actual transcript of their four-day trial, which was later published in the West, was included in a collection of documents that Mr. Ginzburg compiled and managed to send out of the Soviet Union. It conformed closely to other transcripts of the sercet courtroom proceedings, which reached the West through different clandestine channels.

4 Others Being Held

Mr. Ginzburg and at least four other young Soviet citizens have been under arrest without trial since January, according to private and official sources in Moscow, Western Europe and the United States. Three of their colleagues were convicted last month of organizing an illegal street demonstration in Moscow.

The case of Mr. Ginzburg and the others sheds light on the drive of Soviet security policemen to break up an amorphous literary underground that has long existed in Moscow and Leningrad.

Unlike the practice during the Stalin era, the Soviet authorities in recent years have generally been tolerant of these little-known people, who profess unorthodox literary and political views, circulate roughly printed news-letters among themseves and dream of a less regimented society.

With a few exceptions, their names mean nothing to the outside world. They have little in common with prominent "rebels" in Soviet literature, such as the poet Andrei Voznesensky or the novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who are recognized as distinguished figures. Mr. Ginsburg and his small band of friends are considered outcasts of society.

They know they are kept under surveillance, but only when they are caught in contact with foreigners who may have intelligence connections, or when they become too outspoken, do the authorities clamp down.

This is what happened to Mr. Sinyavsky and Mr. Daniel, an this is what now seems to be happening to some of the little-known people who continue to champion the writers' cause.

Mr. Ginzburg was arrested on last Jan. 22, during a short-lived street demonstration in Pushkin Square, in the heart of Moscow.

He had already served a two-years prison term in 1960-62, after he had circulated an unauthorized newsletter called Sintaxis. He signed a letter of repentance that was printed in Vechernyaya Moskva in June, 1965, but he later disavowed this, saying that "long months of solitary confinement — I know this from personal experience—are apt to produce harmful effects on the human mind."

Another Newsletter Prepared

Mr. Ginzburg circulated his documents on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in October, 1966, under the title "White Paper." He also assisted in the preparation of a new anti-Soviet newsletter, Phoenix 1966, excerpts of which appeared in the Emigré literary magazine Grani, published in Franfurt.

Late last year, with little publicity, a new decree was incorporated into the Soviet Criminal Code making punishable by imprisonment "systematic and deliberate dissemination of fabrications designed to defile the Soviet system," and "participation in group activities affecting public orders."

On this legal basis the security police moved into action. On Jan. 17 and 18 they arrested four persons involved in the preparation of the Phoenix Newsletter, including its editor, Yuri Galanskov.

Mr. Galanskov was sent to a mental home, a frequent alternative to imprisonment for people whose defiance of Soviet authority is apparently considered sufficient grounds to declare them insane.

Mr. Ginzburg's Moscow apartment was searched during this roundup. But he was not arrested until five days later when he and some friends tried to unfurl banners and protest in public the arrests and the new decree limiting public demonstrations.

As a Soviet journalist with the Novosti press agency later described it, "They molested passers-by and insulted militiamen attracted by the noise." The demonstration was broken up within minutes.

Vladimir Bukovsky, arrested three days later, confessed to

THE REPORTER

June 1, 1967

The Intellectual Revolt In Poland

TIBOR SZAMUELY

ON JANUARY 8, Peter Raina, a young Indian leftist scholar, was expelled from Poland, where he had lived and worked for more than four years. It was a harrowing experience: Raina was held at the East German border for almost twelve hours while Polish guards methodically went through his belongings, reading every scrap of paper. Finally they let him go after confiscating a three-hundred-page manuscript of a biography of Communist Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka on which he had been working, with official encouragement and help, for about two years.

Raina had come to Poland full of sympathy for the Gomulka régime. He learned to love the country, its language and culture. Warsaw University gave him a doctorate. Wanting to see only the best, for a long time he resolutely dismissed all western criticisms as propaganda. He wrote letters to the foreign press attacking western correspondents for their lack of understanding of Poland and accusing them, among other things, of slandering the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Thus it came as a shock to be called an enemy of the state by that very ministry and to be ordered by it to leave the country within forty-eight hours.

When he finally reached West Germany, Dr. Raina unburdened his disillusionment to the press, broadcast to Poland on Radio Free Europe, and made public a scathing letter he had written to the Polish Minister of Interior Affairs. His story is informative, for it sheds light on some little-known aspects of what is probably the most important process at present taking place in Poland: the new ferment among the intellectuals.

Lament for October

Since about 1960, Warsaw University, and particularly its departments of the humanities and social sciences, has become the center of disaffection spreading among the younger generation of intellectuals. In November, 1964, the security police arrested a group of the university's young lecturers and students. One of the lecturers was Karol Modzelewski, a stepson of the late Polish Communist Foreign Minister and a leader of the pro-Gomulka student movement of 1956. They were all accused of having circulated a paper criticizing the Communist system in Poland. Although soon released, five of them were expelled from the party.

Administrative sanctions, usually an effective warning, didn't work this time. Modzelewski and a friend, Jacek Kuron, composed an open letter to the party. When they distributed it in March, 1965, they were immediately rearrested. No one was surprised, for the document was a devastating indictment—couched in impeccable Marxist terms—of Poland under Gomulka: "To whom does power belong in our state?" the authors asked. "To one monopolistic party—the Polish United Workers' Party. . . . The decisions of the elite are independent, free of any control on the part of the working class and of the remaining classes and social strata."

The Poland which Modzelewski and Kuron described and analyzed with a wealth of statistical and other evidence is, in fact, the familiar Stalinist system—which Communist leaders and wishful thinkers in the West insist was swept away in the cleansing aftermath of the 1956 Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. But it was the authors' conclusion that was intolerable to the authorities: "In view of the impossibility of overcoming the economic and social crisis within the framework of the bureaucratic system, revolution is inevitable." Modzelewski and Kuron were tried in July, 1965, behind closed doors, with the courthouse surrounded by a tense crowd of students. They were sentenced to three and a half and three years respectively.

This, however, was far from the end of the affair. Modzelewski and Kuron had been voluntarily defended in court by some of the most esteemed figures of Polish intellectual life: Antoni Slonimski, the dean of Polish writers, and Professors Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Leopold Infeld, and Leszek Kolakowski. It was Kolakowski who occupied the center of the stage. His reputation and popularity as a champion of intellectual and political freedom—and as Poland's leading Marxist philosopher—was established in the "Polish October" of 1956. He was one who rallied the intellectuals and students behind Gomulka and the ideal of rebuilding Polish Communism on an ethical, libertarian, and humanistic foundation.

Today his fiery declarations of ten years ago may well seem naïve—not least to Kolakowski himself—but at the time they conveyed hope. In his ideological credo, published in 1957, Kolakowski argued that the true Communist's place was on the side of the oppressed and the persecuted: "No one is exempt from the moral duty to fight against a system or rule, a doctrine or social conditions which he considers to be vile and inhuman, by resorting to the argument that he considers them historically necessary." Through the sad years of Gomulka's gradual repudiation of all that he seemed to represent in 1956, Professor Kolakowski had retreated into semi-passivity. The case of

Modzelewski and Kuron forced him again to face up to the dilemma of the idealistic Communist in a repressive Communist state.

It is at this point that young Peter Raina enters the story. Dr. Raina was a devoted admirer of Kolakowski, and he unhestitatingly joined his professor in protesting the sentences given the two teachers.

Last year, the party leadership decided to stamp out student unrest and began a series of repressive measures directed against Warsaw University; a number of students were expelled, new disciplinary rules were introduced, party control was tightened. The restrictions brought a wave of even more vociferous indignation. Protest meetings were held, delegations dispatched, signatures collected. There were noisy scenes at the 1966 May Day demonstration.

In the meantime, ever-increasing pressure we being applied to Leszek Kolakowski. In March, 1966, he was summoned before the party Control Commission and called upon to submit a declaration retracting his views. Despite a grueling interrogation, he remained obdurate. The climax came on October 21, the tenth anniversary of the uprising that had swept Gomulka to power. A commemorative meeting was held in the history department of the university, at which Kolakowski spoke for about half an hour. His message, as reported in a Polish paper in London, was on the order of an obituary of freedom in his country:

"Genuine democracy is lacking here. There is very little public choice of the leaders. Thus, the leadership, which is not really elected, becomes conceited, self-assured. There is no opposition; hence there is no confrontation between those who are in power and those who are without. . . .

"The government does not feel responsible to the nation. The system of privileges is prevalent. These privileges exist for a few outside the law. . . . Public criticism is lacking. Free assembly is nonexistent. Censorship is extremely severe. . . .

"All this has weakened society, for there is no perspective, no hope. The state, the party, the society are the victims of stagnation. There is therefore nothing to celebrate."

Speaker after speaker rose to reiterate the main points of this comprehensive indictment. Among them was Peter Raina. Two resolutions were moved: one demanding the introduction of freedom of speech and the abolition of censorship and political repression, the other calling for the immediate release of Modzelewski and Kuron. Although the motions were not allowed to be put to a vote, the thunderous acclaim with which they were received spoke for itself.

Unity in Protest

Next day Professor Kolakowski was summarily expelled from the party. In the following few days his assistant was also expelled, six students were suspended, and seven others were sent before the university's disciplinary commission. A systematic campaign of calumny was mounted with the object of discrediting Kolakowski, who was accused of being "a tool in the hands of the imperialists."

On November 15, the university organization of the Communist Party held a general meeting; it was addressed by Zenon Kliszko—the secretary of the Central Committee, the chief party theoretician, and Gomulka's second-in-command—and by Stanislaw Kociolek, first secretary of the Warsaw committee of the party. Kliszko trotted out all the clichés about the perils of revisionism; Kociolek went straight to the point: "I am against discussions, dialogues, and seminars. The unity of the party is supreme. Discipline is the cardinal principle of the life of the party." Instead of giving the expected dutiful assent, the assembled university Communists launched an attack on the party's leadership. Kliszko, driven into a corner, protested: "I didn't come to this meeting to present any explanations. I came to listen to them." Similar stormy scenes were repeated at party meetings held in other leading cultural institutions. The intelligentsia clearly was getting out of hand.

The conflict spread fast. On November 25, fifteen writers, all active members of the party and regular contributors to official periodicals, sent a letter to the Central Committee expressing their solidarity with Professor Kolakowski and demanding his reinstatement. The response of the party bureaucracy remained doctrinaire—and ineffectual. The writers were summoned to the Central Committee, where, one by one, they refused to withdraw their protest. Six of them, including prewar Communists, driven at length into rebellion against the beliefs of a lifetime, resigned from the party. Seven others were suspended. Nor was the party leadership any more successful in its dealings with the Writers' Union as a whole. At a special meeting of the party organization of the union's Warsaw sections (numbering about a hundred members) that was convened to condemn the actions of Kolakowski and his supporters, only one speaker supported the official line.

It would be wrong to assume that all those who joined this broad front of intellectual dissent necessarily subscribe to Modzelewski's or Kolakowski's views. The principle that unites them is opposition to the stifling system of Communist conformity, to the totalitarian controls over thought and speech and writing, to the subjugation of the intellect and the prostitution of culture. Yet, as the history of Communism—whether in Poland, the Soviet Union, or any other "socialist" state—has shown, the party cannot afford to compromise this control. The result it has achieved in Poland has been the successive alienation of the intellectual community, and with every new purge the area of revolt grows wider.

Peter Raina's letter to the Minister of Interior Affairs summed up the sense of betrayal.

"A few days ago," he wrote, "when I went to the militia headquarters in order to have my visa extended, I was greatly surprised by the decision of the militia not to extend my stay in Poland. I was aghast at the motivation of this decision, namely that I have a hostile attitude toward Poland. . . .

"For the first time in my life I came against a case when the control of university life was exercised by secret agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. . . .

"I never had any treacherous intentions towards Poland. I always defended Polish interest. I published abroad letters which criticized foreign correspondents for their lack of understanding of Poland. I endeavored within the limits of my possibilities to spread Polish culture through numerous translations of Polish literature. I feel, therefore, greatly injured by the mendacious accusations formulated against me by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. I am writing to you that thanks to the activity of agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs at the university, everybody is governed by fear and one cannot behave normally and calmly at seminars and meetings. I am ashamed for the university and its leadership that things have come to such a pass that low and dirty methods are applied to students, methods that recall the times of fascism and its terror. Methods applied to me during the last few days at the militia headquarters (to wit, the denial of any possibility of explaining things) recall to my mind the methods of Stalinism.

". . . the events of the last days convinced me that all the ministries, the university, the whole cultural life, the political parties, the parliament, were subject to orders of the Ministry of Interior Affairs from which there was no appeal and that nobody had the courage to dare even to make a rightful protest against unjust treatment."

A fair description of a country which was only recently being advertised as a showplace of "liberal" Communism—and a melancholy epitaph to the illusions of an idealist who learned about Communism the hard way.

NEW STATESMAN
8 September 1967

Smashing Down the Intellectuals

GABRIEL LORINCE

The latest Moscow trial of young Soviet writers accused of organising a protest demonstration against new political 'muzzle laws' has served as a powerful reminder that when the young liberalisers go too fast and too far for the party's liking, the authorities invariably slam on the brakes. Vladimir Bukovsky, 25, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment last Friday. Two others were given suspended sentences at the end of a three-day hearing which excluded Western correspondents and fellow-writers.

Bukovsky, Delany and Kushev were arrested last January after some 50 young demonstrators demanded the release of four writers who disappeared after producing the underground magazine *Phoenix 1966*. Their home-made banners, which they unfurled in Moscow's Pushkin Square, also demanded the repeal of the 'unconstitutional' Article 190 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which provides for up to three years' imprisonment for the spreading of false information about the Soviet state or for organising group disturbances of public order. The law was introduced last year after the trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel on charges of publishing 'slanderous anti-Soviet works' in the West.

Last February Viktor Khaustov, a 28-year-old writer, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for his part in the abortive Pushkin Square demonstration. Another demonstrator was confined to a mental home, while three others were released but ordered to report for psychiatric treatment at a Moscow institute. The timing of the present trial, which comes over six months after the first sentences meted out for the same 'crime', has been taken as an indication that, alarmed at the ever-growing demands by Soviet writers for greater artistic and personal freedom, the Soviet government feels once again forced to tighten the screws.

This has been borne out by Moscow reports that the editorial staff of *Phoenix 1966* will be tried in the near future. Yuri Galanskov, the editor, Alexei Dobrovolsky, Pyotr Rodzievsky and Vera Lashkova were arrested about the time a copy of their magazine reached the West. The young poet Alexandr Ginsberg, who had compiled a 404-page 'White Paper' on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and who delivered a copy of it to the residence of President Podgorny, was arrested shortly after the Pushkin Square demonstration and is expected to stand trial together with the others.

Despite the threats and harsh sentences, however, the writers' revolt continues to grow, and the protests against oppression are getting louder. Alexander Solzhenitsin, author of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, describing the horrors of Stalin's concentration camps, demanded that the recent Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers discuss the 'intolerable oppression to which Soviet literature has been subjected for decades by censorship'. In a moving memorandum he listed over 600 'totally innocent writers' whom the leaders of the Writers' Union 'abjectly abandoned to their fate – banishment, prison camps or death' during the entire period of Stalinism.

Andrei Voznesensky, one of the leading young poets of Russia, was prevented by the authorities from taking part in a poetry recital in New York last month because of his protest against censorship in the Soviet Union. In an individual protest letter, he had supported Solzhenitsin's stand and called for the abolition of literary – although not political – censorship. The officials of the Writers' Union replied by cancelling his visit, informing foreign correspondents in Moscow that Voznesensky was 'ill'. In an indignant letter to the editor of *Pravda*, a very healthy Voznesensky protested against the humiliation. He added: 'One can see that the officials of the Soviet Writers' Union do not take writers for human beings. Such dealings in lies and evasions have become a habit. My comrades are treated in exactly the same way. Letters do not reach us, sometimes they are replied to by other people. All around us are lies, lies, off-handedness and lies again. I am ashamed to belong to the same Union as these people. That is why I am writing this letter to your paper; it is called *Pravda* (the truth).' The letter was not published.

Unlike the Hungarian writers in the 1950s, the Soviet writers are not alone in their struggle against the inconsistent stop-go cultural policies of their government. Their protests against the curtailment of personal and artistic freedom get a ready response in Eastern Europe in general and in Czechoslovakia in particular. At their recent congress, the Czech writers protested against the persecution of Solzhenitsin, demanded the abandonment of political censorship and raised their voice against anti-semitism being elevated to state policy towards Israel (NS, 21 July). And when the authorities retaliated by repressive measures of Stalinist brutality, 183 writers and nearly as many artists and intellectuals turned to the West for support.

The unprecedented 1,000-word appeal, which reached the West last weekend, is addressed 'especially to you, leftish Western intellectuals who are still subject to dangerous illusions about democracy and freedom in the socialist countries'. It complains of silenced writers, threatened literary livelihoods, police persecution; of unscrupulous interference in the democratic election of the Writers' Union leadership. 'A witch-hunt of pronounced *fascist* character has been unleashed against the entire Czechoslovak writers' community', the appeal stated. Its signatories, who describe themselves as convinced Marxists and communists with an unwavering belief in socialism, conclude:

> Protest! Defend democracy! Defend freedom! Do not permit the victory of terror over the independence of the soul! And remember that freedom of expression is not only *your* moral prerogative.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 October 1967

SCHOLAR ON TRIAL IN WARSAW COURT

Jewish Woman Is Accused of Anti-Regime Activities

By JONATHAN RANDAL
Special to The New York Times

WARSAW, Oct. 20—The prosecution today wound up behind closed doors its case against a young Jewish woman charged with preparing to send abroad written material deemed harmful to the Polish Communist regime.

Informed sources said the prosecution had asked for a heavy sentence for the defendant, Nina Karsow, who is expected to address a final plea to the provincial Warsaw court on Monday. The public verdict will be read no later than Thursday, the sources said.

Miss Karsow is a 26-year-old graduate of the Polish philology department of Warsaw University and considered an expert on contemporary Polish literature.

Former Communists on List

The nature of the indictment against Miss Karsow has not been made public, but a clue was provided by a list of witnesses posted on the courtroom door. The list included the names of some leading intellectuals who have been jailed in the past for criticizing the Communist party's policies.

Two of them were Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski. They were philosophy instructors at Warsaw University who were expelled from the Communist party and jailed in 1965 for having circulated a signed open letter criticizing the lack of democratic procedures in the party. They were both released earlier this year.

At the time of her arrest in August 1966, Miss Karson was the secretary of Szymon Szechter, a blind Jewish history researcher, and was also employed at the Adam Mickiewicz Museum in Warsaw.

When the trial opened, at the request of the prosecution, the presiding judge ordered the courtroom cleared before the indictment was read.

The judge overruled a defense plea that the trial be held in an open court on the ground that the nature of the charges affected state interests.

Miss Karsow is reported to be still affected by injuries suffered when she and her parents jumped from a Nazi death train that was taking them to the Treblinka extermination camp near Warsaw in 1943.

Her mother was killed on the spot and her father later committed suicide.

The 2-year-od girl was then adopted by Mrs. Stanislawa Karsow Szymaniewski, a wartime member of the pro-Western underground. Mrs. Szymaniewski is seriously ill herself as a result of her imprisonment during the postwar Stalinist period following her conviction on charges of high treason in 1949.

Although the nature of material found in Miss Karsow's possession was not disclosed, informed sources suggested that the charge of preparing to send manuscripts abroad involved Radio Free Europe and the Paris-based Kultura Publishing house, run by Polish exiles.

Radio Free Europe has broadcast news about Poland and other Eastern European countries for almost 20 years and is vilified by the regime, as is Kultura, which publishes manuscripts smuggled out of Poland.

BALTIMORE SUN
12 October 1967

Soviet Writers Warned On West

Moscow, Oct. 11 (*Reuters*)—The Soviet Writers' Union today warned Russian writers and poets that handing over their unpublished works to Western publishers could be regarded as treachery.

The warning came in *Literary Gazette*, weekly publication of the union, which alleged that Western intelligence was ready with "provocations, blackmail and brute force" to persuade Soviet tourists to work for them or defect.

Particular Attention

The author of the article, Yevgency Pinchukov, said Soviet scientists traveling or working in the West received particular attention from intelligence agents.

Although the article came almost a week after a Kiev University nuclear scientist, Dr. Boris Dotsenko, announced his decision to stay in Canada, where he was studying on a research grant, Pinchukov did not mention the case.

"Work Over" Citizens

But he said only cowardly, weak-willed people could give in to pressure, even if they were compromised, and promised that Russians who had contacts with Western intelligence "by mistake" had nothing to fear if they confessed.

Pinchukov said Western publishers specializing in works inimical to the Soviet people worked for Western intelligence and were used to "work over" Soviet citizens in the West.

They kept a special watch on visiting Soviet writers and journalists "with the aim of getting hold of manuscripts of works which have not been published in the Soviet Union because of their ideological or artistic immaturity."

He claimed that these publishers often distorted the texts of writings by Soviet authors, supplied anti-Soviet forewords or organized provocative propaganda campaigns around them.

Writers Criticized

Last week a session of the board of the Writers' Union of the Russian Federation criticized unnamed writers alleged to have deliberately supplied Western radio stations broadcasting to Russia with anti-Soviet material.

Several unpublished works by writers living here have been published in the West this year, including an autobiographical work by old-time a Communist, Yevgenia Ginsburh, about her experiences in a Stalinist labor camp for women.

Writers' Fate Still Unknown

Paris, Oct. 11 (*Reuters*) — A French philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, said today he was extremely concerned about the fate of eleven young Soviet intellectuals in custody in Leningrad since February on unspecified charges.

Marcel, who said he got his information from private sources whom he could not identify, said he learned that some of them already were sentenced in May. He had no information on the number of accused or the nature of the sentences in the May trial.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 September 1967

Tribute to Masaryk First by Czech Reds

By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Sept. 15—Thomas G. Masaryk, who founded—some say invented—modern Czechoslovakia and whose memory has been first condemned and then ignored in the Czech press for the last 19 years, was paid an extraordinary tribute on the front page of a leading periodical here today.

In a 900-word article in Literarni Novini, the nation's leading literary magazine, Mr. Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia, was called "a passionate politician who proclaimed honorable principles, and, what is more, acted upon them."

The article had a startling effect in Prague, where the magazine was quickly bought up and where waiters hastened to point it out to patrons in the cafes.

It was written in an oddly personal tone, in which affection for Mr. Masaryk contrasted with a sarcasm whose object, though not identified, was plainly the present ruling group of Czechoslovakia.

"He earned recognition, even from enemies, and that for something we no longer know, because he honored and tolerated even opinions he himself disagreed with," the article said. "He gained followers without trying to win them, and without threatening them."

This allusion to the intolerant pattern that has largely characterized the Communist party leadership was all the more remarkable in view of the identity of the author.

He is Jan Prochazka, a highly successful but less highly esteemed writer who has been favored with a number of official posts. He is a candidate member of the party Central Committee, president of the Writer's Union and is a close friend of President Antonin Novotny.

Regarded as Official

Mr. Prochazka is regarded by many as something of an official writer. However, some of the most radical of the young writers who have been challenging the regime by the boldness of their criticism say that Mr. Prochazka has worked quietly and effectively to protect them from reprisals.

The article, entitled "14 IX. 1937" commemorated the anniversary yesterday of the death of Mr. Masaryk at the age of 87.

A professor, philosopher and politician, he worked within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to assert the existence of a Czech nationality. After World War I he persuaded the great powers that the Czechs and the Slovaks should be given a nation. He became President of that nation and served until 1935.

Despite the reverence with which Czechs and Slovaks remember him, the Communists until today have not permitted any public praise of him. According to reliable sources, the censor who passed the article refused to allow Literarni Novini to publish a picture of Mr. Masaryk as well.

Dispute in Progress

Czech writers are currently in serious conflict with the regime because of criticism voiced about the Communist party and its policies during a writers' congress last June.

The party Central Committee is to meet at the end of this month, and some form of punishment is expected.

In the memory of many Czechs, Mr. Masaryk embodied qualities that Czechs like to think of as ones that they themselves possess.

"When Thomas Masaryk died, my mother cried and my father said we were heading for hard times," was the way Mr. Prochazka began his article.

Calling him "a philosopher who continuously and passionately entered practical disputes," Mr. Prochazka said that "all the time he was a pedagogue, and educator, because he knew that to lead any nation means a continuous fight with this nation's bad qualities."

Reference to Revolution

The author noted that Mr. Masaryk was not a Marxist and did not understand the Bolshevik Revolution, but he said "it would be very silly to judge Masaryk in relation with events in Russia."

Later, in what apparently was allusion to Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia, he said: "Our revolution has grown up and it is not only a Socialist revolution, but also a Czech and a Slovak one, and what is more, European."

In a sharp comment on the current scene here, Mr. Prochazka recalled a saying of Mr. Masaryk's: "Let's never be afraid and let's not steal." The author then added pointedly: "T. G. Masaryk undoubtedly has a lot to say to contemporary Socialist people."

THE ECONOMIST
7 October 1967

We must talk about freedom

Mr Novotny has decided to crack the whip over Czechoslovakia's restive writers. After a meeting of the party central committee last week it was announced that three prominent writers—Ludvik Vaculik, Ivan Klima and Antonin Liehm—had been expelled from the party; all three were on the staff of *Literarni Noviny*, the journal of the writers' union, and all three had strongly criticised government policies at the writers' congress in June. Another prominent critic of the government, Jan Prochazka, was removed as a candidate member of the central committee and two others, Milan Kundera and Pavel Kohout, were sharply censured by Mr Hendrych, the party's chief ideologist.

The review *Literarni Noviny* has been the chief outlet for writers who wanted to get their disapproval of the regime off their chest publicly. Not surprisingly, the central committee also recommended that it should be placed under the control of the ministry of culture and information. But this was evidently not considered sufficient punishment. This week there have been reliable reports that the review is to stop publication altogether and its editorial board is to be disbanded; it will be replaced by a new review produced by the ministry of culture.

Now that the Czechs are fully embarked on the uncharted and treacherous waters of economic reform, the regime is naturally anxious to prevent its unsettled intellectuals from dangerously rocking the boat. The introduction of major economic changes at the beginning of this year coincided with the government's decision to set up a ministry of culture and information and give it the job of drumming everyone into line on every cultural front. (In fact, the new ministry, headed by Mr Karel Hoffman, hardly seems to have got off the ground so far.) Before the writers' congress in June the government tried hard with "warnings and frequent admonitions"—Mr Hendrych's words—to prevent the occasion from becoming the damaging demonstration of opposition to government policies which it in fact turned out to be. After the congress there was a long wrangle between the writers and the party over who was suitable to run the union; it was not until mid-September that a compromise arrangement was finally accepted by both sides. After so much insubordination, the party may well have decided that it had given the intellectuals quite enough rope and it was time for a display of toughness.

Although most of the recalcitrant intellectuals are professed communists, the gap between them and the party will clearly not be easily bridged. Czech party leaders insist again and again that opinions alien to socialism and the party cannot be tolerated and that it is for the party to define what is, and what is not, tolerable. They complain that the writers are in effect denying the party any role in cultural affairs at all. "The ideological attitude of the criticised writers," declared Mr Hendrych last week, "is at fundamental variance with the policy of the communist party" because it leads to a demand to "negate the role of the party in the field of culture." But the feeling that seems to be at the bottom of the writers' dissatisfaction is a sense of insecurity.

So long as the party claims to be omnipotent, there can be no real guarantee of freedom of expression; only the rule of law (not the rule of the party) can give that. One of the speakers at the writers' congress referred to the regime's annoyance at their constant talk of freedom. "It does not understand," he added, "that freedom exists only in places where one does not need to speak about it." The party's actions last week do not suggest that it has taken the advice to heart.